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PORTER HOAGLAND III*

The Conservation and Disposal of
Ocean Hard Minerals: A
Comparison of Ocean Mining
Codes in the United States**
ABSTRACT
We compare and contrast existing and proposed ocean mining
codes in the United States in the context of currentefforts to establish
disparate systems to dispose of ocean hard minerals. Broadpublic
policy goals and specific "core" provisions relating to access, revenue generation, performance requirements, and information management are consideredas they influence public ocean mineraldisposal.
To aid in understanding the relationship between "disposal" and
"economic conservation," we separate uncertainty into legal and
geologic components, distinguish managerialdiscretionfrom management flexibility, identify the potentialfor preferential treatment
of ocean hardmineral development, and describe the advantages of
a uniform methodfor public mineral disposal. For ocean hard minerals, attempts to achieve specified policy goals through their disposal could supplant a goal of economic conservation.
INTRODUCTION

In 1983, an Office of Strategic and International Minerals was created
within the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the U.S. Department
of the Interior.' The mission of this new office has been to encourage the

exploration and development of ocean hard mineral resources2 on the

*Research Associate, Marine Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. B.S. 1977,
Hobart College; M.M.P. 1982, College of Marine Studies, Univ. of Delaware.
**Research supported by the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Marine Policy Center of the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution (WHOI), and with funds from the Department of Commerce, NOAA,
National Sea Grant College Program under grant Nos. NA84-AA-D-00033 and NA86-AA-D-SG090
(WHOI project Nos. R/G-9 and R/S-9). The author gratefully acknowledges the careful readings
and encouragement provided by Jim Broadus and the comments and suggestions received on earlier
drafts from Scott Farrow and Andy Solow. The views expressed here are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the positions of either WHOI or the sponsoring organizations. The
author accepts full responsibility for any shortcomings. WHOI Contribution No. 6714.
1. John B. Smith, Buford R. Holt, and Robert G. Paul, Current Status of Leasing Proposals for
the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, 17 Offsh. Tech. Conf. 9 (1985).
2. We use the term "ocean hard minerals" here to mean "minerals other than oil, gas and sulphur"
as defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k) (1982). The
U.S. Department of the Interior has estimated that about 88 types of ocean hard minerals may be
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United States outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and to develop a program
for leasing these minerals within the ambit of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA),4 an ocean mining code. As preliminary steps toward
accomplishing this mission, MMS already has released three environmental impact statements (EISs), one final' and two draft, 7 that consider
the environmental effects of the leasing of OCS lands for these minerals.
Using the advice of an interagency task force, MMS has begun to construct
regulations to carry out the provisions of the relatively nonspecific paragraph in OCSLA referring to ocean hard minerals.' These regulations
will sculpt a competitive leasing system, possibly modified by inventive
provisions to reduce the perceived size of "upfront" payments.9
Irrespective of their economic potential,"0 interest in the public policy
of commercial interest. U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, A National Program
for the Assessment and Development of the Mineral Resources of the U.S. Exclusive Economic
Zone 269 (1983) "USGS Symposium". The 88 minerals are essentially those commodities that are
recovered from onshore deposits worldwide and that are analyzed annually by the U.S. Bureau of
Mines in its Mineral Commodity Summaries series. Careful analysis suggests that near term ocean
hard mineral prospects may be limited to only a few of these 88. See note 10.
3. Smith, Holt & Paul, 17 Offsh. Tech. Conf. at 9 (cited in note 1).
4. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982).
5. For a definition of the term "ocean mining code," see notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
6. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Final Environmental Impact Statement Proposed Arctic Sand and Gravel Lease Sale (1983) ("Sand and Gravel FEIS").
7. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Draft Environmental Impact Statement Proposed Polymetallic Sulfide Minerals Lease Offering, Gorda Ridge Area, Offshore Oregon
and Northern California (1983) ("Gorda Ridge DEIS"). U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Draft Environmental Impact Statement Proposed Marine Mineral Lease Sale in
the Hawaiian Archipelago and Johnston Island Exclusive Economic Zones (1987) ("Cobalt Crust
DEIS").
8. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k) (1982). The interagency task force is chaired by an official from
the Minerals Management Service's (MMS) Office of Strategic and International Minerals (OSIM)
and has included participation from several other offices within MMS, as well as representatives
from the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Bureau of Mines,
the Interior Solicitor's Office, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA)
Office of Ocean Minerals and Energy (OME), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. U.S. Dept.
of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Briefing Book: OCS Marine Mining (1987).
9. Reid T. Stone and Timothy J. MacGillvray, Economic Assessment and Review of the U.S.
Exclusive Economic Zone, 4 Circum-Pacific Energy and Min. Conf. (Aug. 1986) (forthcoming).
"Upfront payments" are defined here as payments, such as bonuses, made by private firms to obtain
rights to explore for and potentially to exploit hard minerals. These payments are made in advance
of production and may be made in advance of detailed knowledge concerning the commercial
feasibility of a mineral deposit. See notes 164-185 and accompanying text.
10. In the United States, actual experience in the mining of ocean hard minerals has been limited.
Within the jurisdiction of coastal states, either internal waters or the territorial sea (43 U.S.C.
§ 1301(a)(2) (1982); 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982)), small dredging operations for construction aggregate,
such as sand and gravel or shell, occur locally. S.J. DeGroot, Marine Sand and Gravel Extraction
in the North Atlantic and Its Potential Environmental Impact, with Emphasis on the North Sea, 10
Ocean Mgmt. 21 (1986). More exotic minerals, like lode barite and gold placers, have been recovered
off the coast of Alaska. Raymond M. Thompson and Kenneth G. Smith, Undersea Lode Mining in
Alaska, 2 Proc. Offsh. Tech. Conf. (1970) (barite mining) and Ken Wells, On Ship Off Alaska, All
that Glitters is Gold from Sea Floor, Wall Street Journal I (Sept. 18, 1987) (gold mining). See also
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issues that pertain to ocean hard minerals has swelled recently, as evidenced by the commissioning of federal-level studies" and the holding

of congressional hearings by two subcommittees in the U.S. House of
Representatives. 2 In 1986, the Marine Policy Center of the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution organized and moderated a series of discussions

concerning the design of an appropriate management system for ocean
U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Geological Survey, Program Feasibility Document: OCS Hard Mineral
Leasing 22 (1979) and H.R. 5464 Hearings (cited in note 12) (prepared statement of William
Bettenberg, Director, Minerals Management Service). Precious coral (a gemstone derived from
marine fauna) is recovered off Hawaii. (Because of its biogenesis, precious coral, a form of calcium
carbonate, is considered a renewable resource, and its production is considered a "fishery.") See
generally Richard W. Grigg, Economics and Future Development of the Precious Coral Fishery in
the Pacific (Chennat Gopalakrishnan, ed.), The Emerging Marine Economy of the Pacific (1984).
By permission of the Interior Department, some prospecting efforts for ferromanganese nodules and
encrustations, titaniferous sands, phosphorites, and carbonate sands have been mounted off both the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts on the federal OCS. See note 112 for a list of permits. Additionally,
several U.S. companies have been involved in prospecting, exploration, and research and development (R&D) activities concerning deep seabed manganese nodules. James M. Broadus, Asian
Pacific Marine Minerals and Industry Structure, 3 J. Mar. Res. Econ. 63 (1986). To date, however,
no large scale commercial recovery of hard minerals by U.S. citizens has occurred from the OCS
or the deep seabed. Broadus reviews the markets and development activities surrounding some
"seabed materials" including: crude oil; natural gas; sand and gravel; calcium carbonate and shell;
phosphorites; heavy mineral placers, such as gold, platinum, titanium sands and associated minerals
such as monazite (source of thorium, yttrium, and rare earths), zirconium and hafnium; massive
sulfides containing zinc and copper; and ferromanganese deposits such as nodules and crusts, containing nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese. James M. Broadus, Seabed Materials, 235 Sci. 853
(1987).
I1. These ongoing and completed studies include: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
An Economic Reconnaissance of Selected Heavy Mineral Placer Deposits in the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone (1987) and U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, An Economic Reconnaissance of Selected Sand and Gravel Deposits in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (1987) conducted
at the request of the Director of the Minerals Management Service; U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA), Marine Mining: Exploring Our Nation's Ocean Frontier (1987),
conducted at the request of the House Committees on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and Science
and Technology; National Research Council, Marine Board, Committee on Technology Requirements
for the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Utilization, (1986-87), established at the request of the
Geological Survey (the results of this study were not published but were incorporated into a Marine
Board study of broader scope concerning Seabed Utilization in the Exclusive Economic Zone (1987
to present) ("EEZ Utilization Draft"); U.S. National Strategic Materials and Minerals Program
Advisory Committee (Mott Committee), examination of EEZ minerals as a subset of its responsibilities as requested by the Secretary of the Interior; U.S. National Advisory Committee on Oceans
and Atmosphere (NACOA), Marine Minerals: An Alternative Mineral Supply (1983) and The Need
for a National Plan of Scientific Exploration for the Exclusive Economic Zone (1986). An additional
NACOA report, which was to be directed at issues arising from the superimposition of the EEZ on
existing jurisdictions, was not completed due to the disbanding of NACOA in the autumn of 1986.
12. The Ocean and the Future, Serial No. 99-18, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986)
("The Ocean and the Future"); Exclusive Economic Zone Hearing: (unpublished hearings before
the Subcomm. on Panama Canal and Outer Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries), 99th Cong., 2d sess. (1986) ("EEZ Hearings"); H.R. 5464-The National
Seabed Hard Minerals Act (unpublished Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Panama Canal and Outer
Continental Shelf of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries), 99th Cong., 2d sess.
(1986) ("H.R. 5464 Hearings").
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hard minerals found in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).' 3 Held
in Washington, D.C., the discussions brought together a diverse group
of participants including industrial interests, environmental and public
interest organizations, and representatives of coastal states. 4 Invited presentations by high-level administrative officials were included in the discussions and congressional staff aides attended as observers." Apart from
the Marine Policy Center, which acted as a disinterested facilitator of the
discussions, the other participants agreed that the existing framework for
the conservation and disposal of ocean hard minerals in the EEZ was
inappropriate. 6
A consensus was reached by these participants on ten "concepts""
that resemble provisions later incorporated into a bill, the National Seabed
Hard Minerals Act (NSHMA), introduced during the second session of
the 99th Congress.' 8 Beyond preliminary hearings, no legislative action
was taken, but the bill was reintroduced, unchanged, during the first
session of the 100th Congress. ' Because the proposed bill, if enacted,
would repeal any applicability of OCSLA to ocean hard minerals, 2 Congress has under consideration a change in the method of "disposal" of
these minerals. 2 '
The U.S. Congress has devised disposal methods for public minerals22
13. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI), "WHOI Moderates Second Meeting of EEZ
Hard Minerals Working Group," Press Release (1986). The Exclusive Economic Zone is defined in
Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983) ("EEZ Proclamation"). The U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone, which extends 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the U.S. territorial
sea is determined, except in cases where it might infringe upon the jurisdiction of another nation,
will hereinafter be referred to generically as the ("EEZ"). Lands ceded to the U.S. coastal states
under the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982), generally the three nautical mile territorial
sea, are excluded from federal minerals management.
14. Id. A list of participants is available from the author.
15. Id. A list of administrative officials and observers is available from the author.
16. Id.
17. Id. A list of the ten concepts is available from the author.
18. National Seabed Hard Minerals Act, H.R. 5464, 99th Cong., 2d sess. (1986).
19. National Seabed Hard Minerals Act (NSHMA), H.R. 1260, 100th Cong., Istsess. (1987).
On 5 August 1987, this bill was marked-up (amended) by the Subcommittee on Oceanography and
reported to the full Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee for further deliberation. Technically,
this version will be considered by the full committee. However, since August 5, the marked-up
version has undergone further modification in order to increase the likelihood of its passage. Although
review is planned by the full committee in 1988, we examine the bill in its most recent modified
status. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute for H.R. 1260 Offered by Mr. Lowry of Washington
(Feb. 1, 1988). We refer to this amended version as "NSHMA (1988)." A copy of this version is
available from the Subcommittee on Oceanography. In the House of Representatives, the Subcommittee on Mining and Natural Resources of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs shares
jurisdiction over the bill with the Oceanography Subcommittee.
20. NSHMA, §504 (1988).
21. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text for a definition of the term "disposal."
22. For the purposes of this article, the term "public minerals" will be defined broadly to include
minerals found on the U.S. public lands (Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1702 (1982)) or otherwise subject to disposal under authorization of the U.S. government. Here,
public minerals will include minerals located on the U.S. outer Continental Shelf or within the U.S.
Exclusive Economic Zone. Deep seabed minerals will also be considered public minerals for the
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several times in its history.23 Currently in the United States, two statutes
govern the disposal of ocean hard minerals: OCSLA and the Deep Seabed
Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA). 24 Two federal agencies, MMS
in the Interior Department and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) in the Commerce Department, have primary
regulatory responsibility under OCSLA and DSHMRA respectively, and
both are in the process of promulgating regulations to carry out these

responsibilities. 5 Except for some marginal, yet cloudy, jurisdictional
overlaps between the two statutes,26 they apply to different resources, for
different purposes, in different areas.27 In particular, these laws provide
purises of comparing and contrasting disposal methods. Of course, deep seabed minerals are not
owned or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of the United States. They can be considered
public resources in the more general sense that they may be defined in international law as the
"common heritage of mankind." United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, Part
XI, §2, art. 136 ("LOS Convention"); Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Dec. 17, 1970,
G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, UN Doc A/8097 (1977). See notes 154158 and accompanying text. For an excellent treatment of the definition of minerals in the United
States see George E. Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "Minerals", 54 N. Dak. L. Rev. 419
(1978).
23. For good overviews of the U.S. federal "mining codes," see George Cameron Coggins &
Charles F. Wilkinson, Federal Public Land and Resources Law (2d ed. 1987); Ronald W. Tank,
Legal Aspects of Geology (1983).
24. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k) (1982); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980
(DSHMRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (1982).
25. For ocean hard minerals, the Minerals Management Service is considering the promulgation
of three sets of rules: (1)exploration [Minerals Management Service, Exploration for Nonenergy
Minerals on the Outer Continental Shelf, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,871 (1984) (advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking)]; (2) leasing [Minerals Management Service, Call for Information to Delineate Areas
of Interest for Further Evaluation for Potential Leasing of Strategic and Nonenergy Minerals Found
in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Outer Continental Shelf, 50 Fed. Reg. 2264 (1985) (call for
information) and Minerals Management Service, Leasing of Nonenergy Minerals in the Outer Continental Shelf, 50 Fed. Reg. 15,590 (1985) (advanced notice of proposed rulemaking)]; and (3)
postlease operations [Minerals Management Service, Postlease Operations for Minerals Other that
Oil, Gas, and Sulphur in the Outer Continental Shelf, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,163 (1986) (advanced notice
of proposed rulemaking)]. Rules governing "prelease prospecting" have been proposed Minerals
Management Service, Prelease Prospecting for Marine Mining Minerals Other than Oil and Gas, 52
Fed. Reg. 9758 (proposed rule to be codified at 30 C.FR. 280), but draft rules governing leasing
or postlease operations have not been published in the Federal Register or released widely and still
are undergoing departmental review. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
has promulgated rules for deep seabed exploration [15 C.F.R. 970 (1988)] and has proposed final
rules for deep seabed commercial recovery National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Deep
Seabed Mining: Proposed Regulations for Commercial Recovery and Revision of Regulations for
Exploration, 51 Fed. Reg. 26,794 (1986) (proposed rule to be codified at 15 CFR. 970 and 971).
26. James M. Broadus & Porter Hoagland III, Rivalry and Coordination in Marine Hard Minerals
Regulation, Proc. Oceans '84 at 415 (1984). This does not imply that such overlaps are uninteresting.
Interior has felt the need to establish its regulatory jurisdiction for outer Continental Shelf hard
minerals management at least to the limit of the EEZ. See Authority to Issue Outer Continental
Shelf Mineral Leases in the Gorda Ridge Area, 92 Interior Dec. 459 (1985).
27. OCSLA 8(k) pertains to "any mineral other than oil, gas, and sulfur." 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k)
(1982). DSHMRA pertains to "hard mineral resource[s]" or "any deposit or accretion on, or just
below, the surface of the deep seabed of nodules which include one or more minerals, at least one
of which contains manganese, nickel, cobalt, or copper." DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1403(6) (1982).
The purposes of OCSLA and DSHMRA are explained at notes 57-78 and in the accompanying text.
OCSLA applies to the submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf of the United States. OCSLA,
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markedly distinct methods for private access to public minerals: OCSLA
grants access through a competitive leasing system and DSHMRA authorizes access through a license-permit system." In many ways, the

proposed NSHMA has been constructed along the lines of DSHMRA,
itself a descendent of the location-patent system, one of the disposal
methods for hard minerals on the U.S. public lands onshore. On a general
level, however, the two statutes and the proposed bill contain similar

mechanisms for public management of ocean hard minerals. A look at
differing policy goals in the context of variable levels of geologic understanding can help to explain the rationale for each mining code. 29
All modem mining codes have been derived from earlier codes, and
it is useful therefore to investigate previous law and policy whenever new
legislation is considered.3" Because of the present (and contemporaneous)
efforts of the U.S. federal executive and legislative branches to establish
43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982). In practice, Interior concentrates its management efforts within 200
nautical miles of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured, essentially the EEZ. Minerals
Management Service, Outer Continental Shelf; Notice of Jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior
Relating to Minerals Other Than Oil, Gas, and Sulphur; Clarification, 48 Fed. Reg. 2450 (1983)
(notice). See also note 24. DSHMRA applies to the deep seabed, defined as that area beyond the
Continental Shelf of any nation. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1403(4) (1982).
28. The definitions of these two methods of access, and their derivations are explained in notes
102-24 and in the accompanying text. A good comparison of different access system methods, with
some attention to the ocean hard minerals case, is Walter J. Mead, Pricing and Buyer Selection
Alternatives (William A. Vogeley, ed.), 3 Econ. Min. Indus. 648 (1976).
29. Uncertainty faced by private developers is separated here into both legal and geologic components. Each kind of uncertainty has the identical effect of raising the private costs of public mineral
development. But the costs of legal uncertainty can be reduced directly through the design of a
mining code. Geologic uncertainty can be reduced only through costly exploration efforts.
30. Retrospective comparisons of mining statutes, particularly international comparisons, often
have been published as guides to private investment options or public international relations policies.
For such a comparison in the case of U.S. coastal states, see U.S. Office of Technology Assessment,
Marine Mining at 281 (cited in note 11) and 1. Leslie Goodier, U.S. Federal and Seacoastal State
Offshore Mining Laws (1972). For a comparison of mining codes governing the U.S. public lands
onshore, see Deborah Fleischer and Ursula Guerrieri, Mineral Leasing on Federal Lands: A Comparison of Key Leasing Elements (American Petroleum Institute Discussion Paper No. 042) (June
1985). Comparative studies have been made of domestic and international mining laws that govern
the mining of the deep seabed for manganese nodules: Richard Todd Louma, A Comparative Study
of National Legislation Concerning the Deep Seabed Mining of Manganese Nodules, 14 J. Mar. L.
and Comm. 243 (1983); E.D. Brown, Deep-Sea Mining: The Consequences of Failure to Agree at
UNCLOS 111,7 Nat. Res. Forum 55 (1983); Jeffrey D. Wilson, Mining the Deep Seabed: Domestic
Regulation, International Law, and UNCLOS III, 18 Tulsa L.J. 207 (1982); and F.M. Auburn,
National Deep Seabed Mining Regimes and Reciprocity, 4 Oil & Gas L. and Tax'n Rev. 125 (1982).
Also see United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Proc. Seminar on
Petroleum Legislation with Particular Reference to Offshore Operations (Mineral Resources Development Series No. 40) (1973).
An obvious benefit from such a comparison is the revelation of differences among laws and policies
that could result, ceteris paribus, in differential encouragement or restriction of development activity
and the hindrance of efficient resource allocation. See, e.g. Thomas J. Tiesberg, Federal Management
of Energy and Mineral Resources on the Public Lands, I I Bell J. of Econ. 448 (1980) for an analysis
of the financial terms across mineral access systems to determine optimal timing of exploration and
development in the absence of "ideal" efficiency conditions. For an analysis of the effects of
"locational" variables, especially tax structures, on the attractiveness of capital investment and
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disparate systems to dispose of ocean hard minerals, 3 it makes sense at
this stage to examine past knowledge, understanding, and practice relating
to these and other "public" minerals.32 Here we compare and contrast
the existing and proposed ocean mining codes in the United States: OCSLA
and its potential regulations, DSHMRA, and NSHMA. First, the public
policy goals incorporated into these laws and initiatives are introduced. 33
Second, some historical perspective and background on the appearance

of these laws and intitiatives and their relationship to ocean hard minerals
is presented.' Third, four "core provisions" that deserve thoughtful consideration, method of access, generation of revenues, requirements for
performance, and handling of resource information, are discussed. 3' Fourth,
an apparent dilemma in mining codes between legal certainty and man-

agement flexibility is analyzed.36 Finally, we summarize some general

points that appear to be useful in considering the disposal of ocean hard
minerals. In the latter context, we note that the advantages of a unified

system of disposal for public minerals, particularly in removing variations
between mining codes that favor the development of one mineral over
another because of locational, geological, or jurisdictional differences,
are not usually considered in the design of a mining code.
OCEAN MINING CODES
Mining Code Definition
The specific collection of rules commonly grouped together into a
"mining code" govern entitlements and activities relating to the develeconomic development in Canadian onshore hard minerals, see Brian W. MacKenzie, Dallas W.
Davis & Michel L. Bilodeau, Effects of Location on the Competitive Position of Mineral Exploration
and Development in Canada (1986). Brooks discusses the problems inherent in establishing different
policies for the same resource in different areas. David B. Brooks, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules:
From Scientific Phenomenon to World Resource, 8 Nat. Res. J. 401 (1968). See also U.S. Public
Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land 121 (1970).
31. These efforts may, in a sense, be rivalrous. The introduction of NSHMA may have occurred,
in part, to push the Minerals Management Service to reconsider its attempts at promulgating regulations for ocean hard mineral activities under OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k) (1982).
32. Especially in the case of the public policies concerning public minerals, lessons can be learned
through examination of a rich and detailed history. This article will not attempt to duplicate the
several excellent historical treatments of the public policy of public minerals. The interested reader
is referred to John D. Leshy, The Mining Law: A Study in Perpetual Motion (1986); Carl J. Mayer
& George A. Riley, Public Domain, Private Dominion (1985); Robert H. Nelson, The Making of
Federal Coal Policy (1983); Tank, Legal Aspects of Geology (cited in note 23); Robert W. Swenson,
Legal Aspects of Mineral Resources Exploitation (Paul W. Gates, ed.), History of Public Land Law
Development (1968) and other references contained in those works.
33. See notes 37-78 and accompanying text.
34. See notes 79-101 and accompanying text.
35. See 102-318 and accompanying text.
36. See notes 319-38 and accompanying text. In particular, it is stressed that, after consideration
of the likelihood of contributions from ocean hard minerals to general mineral supply, there is plenty
of time for thoughtful consideration of public policy goals and issues. The Ocean and the Future at
130 (cited in note 12) (prepared statement of James M. Broadus, Director, Marine Policy Center,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution).
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opment of mineral resources. Mining codes have been employed at least
since the medieval period to reduce the private risks associated with
mineral development activity) 7 In the Americas, the first mining code

was introduced by Spanish Conquistadors in 1550, and it contained some
rudiments of successive codes.3" Modem mining codes can be imagined
to encompass the universe of restrictions or incentives relating to mineral
entitlements found explicitly and implicitly in international treaties, domestic legislation, regulations, contracts, and common law precedent. In
this analysis, however, we employ a narrower definition of mining code,
restricted to the policies expressed in U.S. federal statutes and their
associated regulations pertaining to ocean hard minerals. Moreover, sta-

tutory provisions relating to environmental protection and federalism,
among others, are given minimal attention here.39 Even within this narrow
definition, a great deal of variation exists among the public goals and
mechanics of federal mining codes.
The paramount purpose of a federal mining code is to offer limited
rights in a mineral property so that the minerals can be employed in the
public's "interest." '4 In the United States, the federal government acts
on the public's behalf4 to manage public minerals so as to maximize the
total return on their disposal.42 It is possible to consider this return as
assuming many public benefit forms other than just a financial return.
Since the early nineteenth century, Congress has employed constitutional authority4" to dispose of public mineral property in a number of
37. Anthony Scott, Does the Government Create Real Property Rights? Private Interests in Natural
Resources 17 (Feb. 15, 1984) (unpublished manuscript). Also see Thomas T. Tapping, The Rhymed
Chronicle of Edward Manlove (1851) a reprint of an original edition dated 1653 that concerns "the
liberties and customs of the lead mines within the Wapentake of Wirksworth, Derbyshire," with a
glossary of principal mining terms and a list of litigations relative to the Derbyshire lead mines.
38. Aiton has claimed that this code, introduced in Mexico, barely resembles present-day mining
codes and that any resemblance may, in fact, be accidental. Aiton, The First American Mining Code,
23 Mich. L. Rev. 105 (1924).
39. This does not subtract from the importance of these issues. As exemplified by the NSHMA
proposal, and by the coalition that formed to draft principles that became embodied in NSHMA (see
note 12 above), these other provisions are very much a part of modem mining codes.
40. The congressional declaration of policy to OCSLA states: "the outer Continental Shelf is a
national resource reserve held by the federal government for the public, which should be made
availablefor expeditious and orderly development" [emphasis added]. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3)
(1982). The public interest could include preservation or nondevelopment. See generally Anthony
C. Fisher & John V. Krutilla, Resource Conservation, Environmental Preservation, and the Rate of
Discount, 89 Q. J. Econ. 358 (1975).
41. See generally Mortimer Adler, We Hold These Truths 18 (1987). C.f. Joseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev.
471, 545 (1970).
42. Nelson postulates that public managers believe that they adhere to a concept of scientific
resource management in the true "conservationist" tradition, but, in fact, resource management may
be shaped by bargaining among interest groups. Nelson, The Making of Federal Coal Policy at 177
(cited in note 26).
43. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3.

Summer 19881

OCEAN HARD MINERALS

ways, in order to achieve several policy goals: revenue generation, 44

national security, 45 territorial expansion,' restructuring of markets, 47 the

settlement of unsettled lands, 48 and technological development. 49 The core

provisions of a mining code, such as the system of access, revenue
generating measures, performance requirements, and the handling of re-

source information, are designed to serve these broader policy purposes.
Both the broader purposes and the core provisions are considered here

because both may influence the management of public minerals in the
public's interest.

Conservation and Disposal
As used in the field of minerals management, the terms "conservation"
and "disposal" are related conceptually. In economics, conservation implies a socially-optimal resource allocation such that mineral resources
are developed at the appropriate moment and rate.5" Conservation might
44. For example, OCSLA states that "leasing activities shall be conducted to assure receipt of
fair market value for the lands leased and rights conveyed by the Federal Government." OCSLA,
43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (1982).
45. The early attempts at leasing lead in the Indiana and Missouri Territories had the twofold
purpose of generating revenue for the young republic and to secure a supply of lead for military
applications. Swenson, Legal Aspects of Mineral Resources Exploitation at 702 (cited in note 32).
46. In 1856, through enactment of the Guano Islands Act, Congress stated "[wihenever any
citizen of the United States discovers a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or key, not within the
lawful jurisdiction of any other government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other government,
and takes peaceable possession thereof, and occupies the same, such island, rock, or key may, at
the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United States" [emphasis added].
The Act allowed occupation by U.S. citizens for the purposes of recovering and selling biogenic
phosphorites to U.S. citizens. Guano Islands Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1419 (1982).
47. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982), was enacted primarily
to prevent a perceived problem of overproduction of oil in California. The Act instituted a leasing
system for hydrocarbon and certain solid minerals on onshore public lands. Public managers believed
that oil production would be more efficient if accomplished by a few large producers. (This conservationist belief was abetted by major California oil producers.) Increased efficiency was thought
possible only by restricting access through the "discretionary" nature of a leasing system, as opposed
to the open access system in existence at that time. The concept of "leasing" arose out of a study
of coal leasing in Australia, conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey in 1907. Mayer & Riley,
Public Domain, Private Dominion at 155-208 (cited in note 32).
48. Through the grant of patent monopolies, the Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1982),
was intended to encourage both mineral development and the settlement of western lands. Mayer
and Riley, Public Domain, Private Dominion at 44 (cited in note 32).
49. In 1980 Congress found that "development of technology required for the exploration and
recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed will require substantial investment for many
years before commercial production can occur, and must proceed at this time if deep seabed minerals
are to be available when needed" [emphasis added]. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(l 1)(1982).
Moreover, Congress declared that one of the purposes of the Act was "to encourage the continued
development of technology necessary to recover the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed."
DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(5) (1982).
50. For two good general overviews of mineral resource conservation, see Anthony Scott, Natural
Resources: The Economics of Conservation 26-38 (1955) and Orris C. Herfindahl, Three Studies in
Minerals Economics 1-12 (1961).
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be achieved by private mineral developers who respond to market signals.
In the presence of market distortions resulting from environmental sideeffects, imperfectly competitive industrial behavior, and superimposed
tax structures, such an ideal situation is difficult to obtain. 5'
In mineral law, disposal implies the transfer of mineral entitlements.52
For public minerals, disposal connotes the transfer of entitlements with
the expected result that public minerals will be recovered according to a
schedule. In this manner, modern public mineral disposal involves a
conservation meted by resource managers." Thus, under public regulation, the timing and rate of mineral resource exploration, development,
and production can differ from that expected under solely private management.
In the United States at the turn of the 20th century, public mineral
"conservation" was invoked to correct actual or perceived market distortions. 4 In addition to remedial provisions for these distortions, modem
mining codes55 contain other disposal provisions that affect the economic
conservation of public minerals.' In this article, we use the term disposal
in the sense of managing the development of public mineral stocks in the
interest of serving not only conservation but other public goals as well.
Policy Goals and Return to the Public
Figure 1 compares some of the broad policy goals for ocean mining
that have been expressly stated or recommended by statute or executive
proclamation. These goals span a wide range including: receiving fair
market value for the resource; encouraging marine technology development; encouraging the development of additional sources of supply for
certain designated strategic minerals; and distinguishing the development
51. Talbot Page, Conservation and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Materials Policy 4-7
(1977).
52. Tank, Legal Aspects of Geology at 307 (cited in note 23).
53. See generally Nelson, The Making of Federal Coal Policy (cited in note 32). Ocean mining
codes refer to "conservation" in a slightly different sense than that used here. Generally, in these
codes, the term is used not in the sense of controlling the timing and rate of production, but rather
in the (related) sense of ensuring that submarginal resources are not disturbed (or "wasted") in such
a way as to preclude potential future production. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a), 1861 (1982);
DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1420 (1982).
54. See generally Mayer & Riley, Public Domain, Private Dominion (cited in note 32).
55. See notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
56. Detailed analysis of these provisions is beyond the scope of this article, but they include
environmental protection, antitrust review, as well as other public management provisions such as
national security "first-buyer" authority. In addition to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1982), among other environmental laws,
environmental protection and safety provisions have been incorporated into OCSLA, 43 U.S.C.
88 1346, 1347, 1348, 1351 (1982) and DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1419 (1982). Antitrust review of
the disposal of public ocean minerals is provided for in OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1337(c), 1344(d)
(1982) and in DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1413 (1982). Depletion allowances, similar to onshore
minerals, may be available for many ocean hard minerals to deduct from general corporate taxes.
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of hard minerals from the development of other mineral types, like hydrocarbons.-" Additional policy goals, such as environmental protection,

antitrust review, and the collection of resource information for management, among others, are important but are not discussed here. The management of resource information is considered below.
Notably, among these statutory goals, only OCSLA attempts to collect
fair market value for the disposal of public ocean minerals." Specific
revenue generating mechanisms, such as bonuses, rentals, and royalties
are employed to accomplish this goal." Revenue generating mechanisms

attempt to garner a portion of economic rent, the difference between
private development costs and gross revenues,' in the form of a financial

return. For OCS minerals, this revenue is placed in the U.S. Treasury's
general account, without any earmarks, except for minor contributions
to two conservancy funds. 6 This revenue then is spent for various public
purposes.

Interestingly, it is possible to consider rent in nonpecuniary terms.
Financial rents may be foregone by the U.S. public in order to achieve
specified policy goals other than the receipt of fair market value.62 Viewed
in this fashion, foregone rents go uncollected and do not reach the treasury.
Thus, foregone rents truly are "earmarked" to pay for public policy
purposes like encouraging private firms to recover certain designated
57. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (1982). Compare the goals of OCSLA with DSHMRA and
the proposed NSHMA in Figure I. The latter two have the common goal of encouraging technology
development, In addition, one of DSHMRA's stated goals is to encourage the development of
manganese nodules because of the perceived strategic importance of this resource and its contained
metals.
58. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (1982). But see NSHMA § 308(a)(2) (1988) (cited in note
19).
59. See notes 167-185 and accompanying text.
60. For a general discussion of economic rent associated with mineral entitlements see Stephen
L. McDonald, The Leasing of Federal Lands for Fossil Fuel Production (1979).
61. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982). The National Historic Preservation Act 16 U.S.C. § 470h
and the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act 16 U.S.C. §4601-5(c)(2) provide specifically for
the transfer of OCS revenues to funds organized by those acts. The annual amounts transferred to
each fund are $150 million for the the National Historic Preservation Fund and approximately $850
million for the Land and Water Conservation Fund. Revenues are transferred annually whether or
not they are used, but Congress must authorize the appropriation of amounts from these funds.
Because Congress is unlikely to authorize an appropriation equal to the entire amount of the holdings
of these funds (the holdings of the Land and Water Conservation fund are approximately $3 billion),
the contribution from OCS revenues can be viewed, in large part, as only a "paper" transfer. In
1984, OCS mineral revenues totalled $8.04 billion. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Minerals Management
Service, Federal Offshore Statistics: 1984 at 49 (1986). Although OCS oil and gas revenues often
are cited as the second largest contributor to the federal government's general account, in 1982 the
contribution was only approximately one percent of annual federal revenues, compared with the
roughly 60% attributed to personal income and corporate taxes. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau
of Census, Statistical Abstract 261 (1985).
62. Viewed from this perspective, foregone rent represents an opportunity cost to the resource
"owner," the public.
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strategic resources or to develop ocean technology. DSHMRA, for example, seeks to achieve these latter purposes and gives little attention to
the collection of financial rents.63

Other implications arise from attempts to achieve some of the purposes

of ocean mining codes. One goal found in the proposed NSHMA, 6
DSHMRA, 65 and the 1983 draft EIS for the Gorda Ridge' expresses a
national need for the development of technology to explore, recover, and
process ocean hard minerals. This goal is superimposed upon a broader
public policy that encourages technological development more generally,
such as tax incentives for research67 and the patent system for inventions.68
To the extent that extra encouragements, like potential rents, are provided
in an ocean mining code to induce technological development, the activity
of ocean mining may be given preferential treatment in U.S. public policy.
Public concerns about the strategic importance of ocean hard minerals
appear in a statement that accompanies the EEZ Proclamation,' as well
as in several publications authored by government officials concerning
the proposed OCSLA regulations.7" The availability of EEZ minerals as
a supplemental source of military-strategic metal commodities has been
a marine policy goal of particular importance to the Reagan Administration. When he proclaimed an EEZ in the United States, President Reagan
63. Note that the deep seabed is beyond the national jurisdiction of the United States. See note
22. Because the U.S. public does not "own" the resources there, it may not deserve a return on
their disposal. How potential rents are "spent" on policy goals is determined beforehand by Congress,
as guided by the legislative process. Once a federal mining code is enacted, this spending decision
appears fixed and without the flexibility to respond to economic changes. Should the "value" of
policy goals exceed true economic rent, Congress might consider subsidizing the ocean mining
industry. But assigning values to public policy goals would be difficult. Moreover, without incorporating some mechanism into a mining code for fine-tuning, it would be difficult to remove builtin subsidies. (The National Academy of Sciences has under consideration recommendations to
establish a joint government-industry effort to explore and exploit ocean hard minerals in the EEZ
and to provide incentives and market assurances for marine mining there. See Marine Board, EEZ
Utilization Draft (cited in note I1I).) If resource managers are given the ability to fine-tune a disposal
authority, an important question concerns the degree to which this kind of management flexibility
raises the level of legal uncertainty and thereby deters private investment in public mineral development. See notes 319-38 and accompanying text.
64. NSHMA, 102(b)(3), (b)(3) (1988) (cited in note 19).
65. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(l 1), (b)(5) (1982).
66. Minerals Management Service, Gorda Ridge DEIS at 395 (cited in note 7).
67. 26 U.S.C. § 174(a)(1982) (research and experimental expenses).
68. See generally U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Laws (1986).
69. United States Ocean Policy, statement by the President, 19 Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents 383 (Mar. 10, 1983).
70. Stone and MacGillvray, 4 Circum-Pacific Energy and Min. Conf. (cited in note 9); John B.
Smith, Managing Nonenergy Mineral Development-Genesis of a Program, Proc. Oceans '85 at
339 (1985); Smith, Holt, and Paul, 17 Offsh. Tech. Conf. at 9 (cited in note I). To the extent that
OCSLA encourages the development of domestic oil and gas sources to guard against the possiblity
of economic disruptions from supply cutoffs from other sources, offshore hydrocarbons also are
treated as a kind of strategic mineral.
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said that "[r]ecently discovered deposits there [in the EEZ] could be an
important future source of strategic minerals." 7 Steps taken to achieve
such a policy goal might encourage the disposal of ocean minerals at a
rate that gives little consideration to economic conservation.
Several government studies and statutes" distinguish or recommend
the need to distinguish the development of hard minerals from the development of hydrocarbon minerals. It is clear that all minerals have
geologic and end-use characteristics that are distinguishing features. It is
not clear that such characteristics are important in justifying mining code
differences, however. To the extent that some minerals are more difficult
to discover, prove-out, and work, then private forecasts of commercial
returns for these minerals will be uncertain. The degree and nature of
uncertainty, not necessarily geologic differences, are important as justifications for differences in mining codes.73
One potential policy goal, which during this century has never been
considered seriously at the national level in the United States, is the
establishment of a unified system for the disposal of public minerals in
the United States.' At least one commentator has described the potential
inefficiencies of differential systems of disposal that provide incentives
for the development of lower quality minerals before the depletion of
those of higher quality." Differential systems might also encourage the
development of one type of mineral before or instead of another. Because
of the plethora of mining codes in the United States, including those on
U.S. public lands onshore,76 state public lands onshore and in the territorial sea,77 and OCSLA and DSHMRA, a unified system appears infeasible. The enactment of OCSLA in 1953, however, might be regarded
as one of the first attempts at such a goal, if only for public ocean minerals,
because it applied 7one
mining code to all types of minerals on the outer
8
Continental Shelf.
71. United States Ocean Policy 383 (cited in note 69).
72. U.S. Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources (Stratton Commission),
Marine Resources and Legal-Political Arrangements for their Development, Panel Reports. Vol. 3
at V- 116 (1969); National Academy of Sciences, Marine Board, Panel on Operational Safety in
Marine Mining, Mining in the Outer Continental Shelf and in the Deep Ocean at 55 (1975) ("NAS
Panel"); Geological Survey, USGS Symposium at 271 (cited in note 2); NSHMA, § 102(b)( I) (1988);
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k) (1982).
73. EEZ Hearings (cited in note 12). Prepared Statement of James M. Broadus, Director, Marine
Policy Center, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.
74. The Mining Law of 1872 was perhaps the closest the United States got to a uniform system
for the disposal of public minerals. Coal, however, was not included under that law. See generally
Leshy, The Mining Law (cited in note 32).
75. Brooks at 419 (cited in note 30).
76. See generally Coggins & Wilkinson, Federal Public Land and Resources Law (cited in note
23); Tank, Legal Aspects of Geology (cited in note 23).
77. OTA, Marine Mining at 281 (cited in note II); Goodier, U.S. Federal and Seacoastal State
Offshore Mining Laws (cited in note 30).
78. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1331(q) (1982). But because OCSLA does not include either locationpatent or preference right lease systems, this uniformity is confined to the OCS.
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Ocean Mining Code Development
Since the mid-1970s, the Department of the Interior has made several
attempts to institute a regulatory framework for ocean hard minerals under
the broad direction of section 8(k) of OCSLA. In 1961, phosphorites
were leased off the California coast, but these leases soon were relinquished.7 9 In 1974, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) published
a draft EIS with details of a mining code for phosphorites and sand and
gravel resources.s' Reaction to the draft was mixed, but mainly negative,
and BLM postponed its effort." In 1979, the Interior Department moved
again to examine the ocean hard mineral case. In that year, the U.S.
Geological Survey published a Program Feasibility Document which recommended a prototype or test lease sale.82 The recommendation went
unheeded until another Administration came into office. In 1982, a new
Secretary of Interior, James Watt, approved departmental efforts to develop and implement an ocean hard mineral leasing system. 3 In 1983,
MMS moved to sell access to sand and gravel resources off Alaska" and
marine polymetallic sulfide (MPS) resources on the Gorda Ridge off
Washington and Oregon. 5 Both a "Notice of Tentative Terms and Conditions" for the sand and gravel sale 6 and the draft EIS for the MPS
sale 7 contained proposed mining code provisions. Partly due to a slumping oil market, Arctic oil and gas industry interest in sand and gravel
waned, and the disposal of these materials was cancelled. 8 The draft EIS
for the Gorda Ridge received negative comments, particularly concerning
the lack of resource and environmental information on the proposed and
alternative actions, and a special federal-state task force was organized
79. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management and Collier Carbon and Chemical
Corporation, Phosphate Lease Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (Feb. 1, 1962) [copy
on file with Pacific OCS Region, Minerals Management Service, Los Angeles, Calif.; entire file
including the lease ("Phosphate Lease File")].
80. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, Proposed Outer Continental Shelf Hard Mineral Mining, Operating and Leasing Regulations (1974) ("1974 Proposed Regulations DEIS").
81. Geological Survey, Program Feasibility Document: OCS Hard Mineral Leasing at 6 (cited in
note 10).
82. Id. at 62 (cited in note 10).
83. Minerals Management Service, Proposed Mineral Materials Lease Form and Request for
Comments, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,143 (1983) (notice).
84. Minerals Management Service, Notice of Tentative Terms and Conditions for an Arctic Sand
and Gravel Sale, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,541 (1983); Minerals Management Service, Request for Supplemental Information; Sand and Gravel Leasing Offshore Alaska, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,761 (1984).
85. Minerals Management Service, Outer Continental Shelf; Proposed Lease Sale of Polymetallic
Sulfide Minerals in the Gorda Ridge; Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, 48 Fed.
Reg. 12,840 (1983) (notice).
86. Minerals Management Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,541 (1983) (cited in note 84).
87. Minerals Management Service, Gorda Ridge DEIS at 391-410 (cited in note 7).
88. Telephone communication with Yvonne Morehouse, Minerals Management Service, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 1986). Arctic sand and gravel would have been used as construction material in
building OCS oil and gas production facilities in the Beaufort Sea.
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to help remedy these problems. 9 In 1984, a similar task force was formed
with the participation of the state of Hawaii to draft an EIS and initiate
steps toward the potential leasing of "cobalt-rich" ferromanganese encrustations. 90
Concurrent with the Interior Department's attempts to initiate an ocean
hard mineral program under OCSLA, Congress examined the enactment
of a statute that would govern the exploration and commercial recovery
of deep seabed manganese nodules. Pressed primarily by the American
Mining Congress and other deep seabed mining interests, Congress considered several draft bills from the late 1960s through their culmination
in the enactment of DSHMRA in 1980. 9' None of the proposals involved
OCSLA-type competitive bonus bid access methods.92 Instead, a firstcome, first-serve method of access to exploration areas, with a preference
right to commercial recovery in the same area, was promoted and enacted.
DSHMRA was seen as an interim, and possibly alternative, mining code
pending the completion of negotiations over an international code for the
deepsea nodule resource at the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea.93 The entitlements created by DSHMRA established a basis

for U.S. companies to invest in deep seabed prospecting and R&D. For
these companies, DSHMRA reduced legal uncertainty through an institutional framework that precluded claim-jumping by other U.S. firms or
foreign firms whose governments agreed to "reciprocate" with the United
States in this area.'
In 1981 and 1982, NOAA promulgated rules governing the granting
of deep seabed exploration licenses.95 Because several licenses were is89. Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Oregon and Department of the
Interior Create Working Group on Gorda Ridge Ocean Mining Assessment, News Release (Feb. 28,
1984).
90. Minerals Management Service, Call for Information to Delineate Areas of Interest for Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement on the Exploration for and Possible Recovery of
Cobalt-Rich Manganese Crusts in the Hawaiian Exclusive Economic Zone, 49 Fed. Reg. 34,099
(1984) (call for information). Similar task forces have been organized by Minerals Management
Service with the states of North Carolina [Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior,
North Carolina and Interior Department Announce Joint Task Force to Study Nonfuel Minerals
Offshore, News Release (Mar. 12, 1986), Georgia Minerals Management Service, U.S. Dept. of
the Interior, Georgia and Interior Department Initiate Cooperative Investigation of Offshore Nonfuel
Minerals, News Release (Oct. 16, 1986)], and the Gulf Coast. involving the states of Texas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama [Interview with John B. Smith, Office of Strategic and International Minerals, Minerals Management Service, Long Beach, Calif. (Dec. 17, 1986)1.
91. A legislative history through 1975 can be found in James E. Mielke, Ocean Manganese
Nodules, Congressional Research Service for Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong.,
1st sess. 59 (1975).
92. A 1970 working paper drafted by the Nixon Administration for use by the United Nations
Seabed Committee did include revenue generating mechanisms such as bonuses, rentals, and royalties. These mechanisms were immediately opposed by the American Mining Congress, a driving
force behind the early DSHMRA proposals. Id. at 61.
93. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1401 (b)(3) (1982).
94. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1428 (1982).
95. 15 C.F.R. §970 (1988).
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sued simultaneously, those firms seeking licenses in the United States
and in other countries met on several occasions to resolve overlapping
claims through the trading of areas and resource information." In 1984,
four licenses (to six areas) were granted to deep seabed mining consortia
in the United States. 97 In 1986, NOAA proposed regulations governing
the grant of permits for commercial recovery.9"
From 1985 to 1987, Congress once more took up consideration of the
need to legislate the disposal of ocean hard minerals, this time on a
proposed "national seabed" of the United States. 99 Again, pressed primarily by ocean mining interests, but with the assistance of environmental
groups and coastal states," Congress has under consideration the "National Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act."' 0 '
COMPARISON OF CORE PROVISIONS

Access: Lease Versus License
The Mining Law of 1872 provided for the disposal of proven mineral
discoveries on public lands onshore such that perfect ownership could be
transferred from the public to an individual or private firm. Individuals
were allowed free access to the U.S. public lands and, in the event a
valuable mineral deposit was located, they could stake a claim to the
deposit and produce the mineral or patent the claim.' 2 The locationpatent system is still the basis for the disposal of most hard minerals on
the U.S. public lands. Mining codes enacted by Congress subsequent to
this "location-patent" system did not allow the permanent transfer of
property rights but instead allowed: (1) transfers of property and devel96. James M. Broadus & Porter Hoagland III, Conflict Resolution in the Assignment of Area
Entitlements for Seabed Mining, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 541 (1984).
97. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. (NOAA), Deep
Seabed Mining Report to Congress 9 (1985). These licenses are available for public review at NOAA
headquarters, Washington, D.C.
98. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 51 Fed. Reg. 26,794 (1986) (cited in note
25).
99. See Congressional hearings referenced in note 12 above. NSHMA would define a "seabed"
beyond the territorial sea and otherwise coincident with the EEZ except in cases where the outer
edge of the continental shelf extends beyond the EEZ. NSHMA § 103(15) (1988). The use of the

term "national seabed" instead of "outer Continental Shelf" is indicative of the concerns of the
supporters of the bill that a framework governing the disposal of ocean hard minerals be kept distinct
from the framework governing the disposal of oil and gas minerals (i.e., OCSLA). At the same
time, private firms involved in offshore oil and gas activity are displeased with the notion that OCSLA
might be opened once again for amendment. The enactment of NSHMA would appear to solve both
problems by creating a new large-scale ocean enclosure with a unique mineral disposal mechanism,
thereby circumventing the need to amend OCSLA. But see note 339.
100. H.R. 5464 Hearings (cited in note 12) (Testimony of Art Rocque, Chairman Emeritus,
Coastal States Organization).
101. See note 19.
102. Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§21-54 (1982). Patenting is not necessarily a prerequisite
for mineral production.
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opment rights through a lease," °3 (2) the allocation of development rights
by license or permit, " or (3) the sale of surface materials in place.'
Figure 2 compares methods of access found in OCSLA, DSHMRA, and
the proposed NSHMA.
FIGURE 2
Access to Ocean Hard Mineral Entitlements
(all activities above the dotted line are nonexclusive;
all activities below the line are exclusive)
OCSLA
Activity
Oceanography
Prospecting
Exploration

Other "Permits"

Development/
Production

Assignment or
Transfer

DSHMRA

NSHMA

first-entrant
license;
exploration plan
approval required
before grant of
license
water quality
waste disposal

first-entrant
license;
exploration plan
approval required
before grant of
license

permit;
commercial
recovery plan
approval required
before production
start

permit;
commercial
recovery plan
approval required
before production
start

permit" or
notice
permit'
competitive auction
for lease;
exploration plan
approval required
before end of
exploration term
water quality
air quality
waste disposal
drilling
construction
navigation
pipelines
coral protection
lease (same as
above);
development/
production plan
approval required
before production
start
approval of public
manager required

unspecified:
possibly similar
to OCSLA

approval of
approval of
public manager
public manager
required
required
'Geological or Geophysical Scientific Research Involving Drilling or Explosives.
'Geological or Geophysical Exploration Activities Not Under a Lease.
'Resolution of concurrently-staked overlapping claims possible.
'The activities of "mapping" and the "random taking of bottom samplings" are specifically exempt
from requiring authorization from the resource manager.
103. See generally Tank, Legal Aspects of Geology at 297-98 (cited in note 23).
104. DSHMRA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982).
105. Surface Materials Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (1976). The purpose of this Act, also
known as the "Common Varieties Act," was to provide for a method of disposal of materials such
as sand, gravel, and stone without disposing of the land on which these minerals were situated.
U.S. v. Coleman 390 U.S. 599, 604 (1968) (denial of application to patent, under the Mining Law
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Legal Differences. From a traditional legal standpoint, a difference
exists between methods of access that employ either leasing or licensing.
Generally, in law, a lease conveys a real property right to the lessee,
whereas a license (or permit) carries only the permission of the licensor
to conduct some predetermined business activity in the licensed area."o
Following this tradition, in mining law, the lease implies the right to
exclude all others from the use of the leased area. 7 Thus a lease consists
of a stronger bundle of rights than a license. Moreover, a license might
be more easily revoked than a lease,' 8 thereby enhancing the "discretion"
of a licensor relative to that of a lessor. 109
From a more modem and pragmatic perspective, the property right
distinction between leasing and licensing has become blurred. Under
of 1872, a mineral discovery of quartzite stone for use as a building material). The Act was designed
to curb the practice of claiming land patents under the 1872 Mining Law on the basis of the location
of common variety minerals. The policy goal here was to reserve the patent system incentive for
the harder-to-find lode and placer minerals. The Act established competitive access for common
varieties, except in special cases as determined by the Secretary of Interior, such as the grant of
surface materials to states, territories, municipalities, or nonprofit corporations.
106. "A lease is a contract for the possession and profit of land by the lessee, and a recompense
A license is an authority
of rent or increase to the lessor, and is a grant of the estate in the land ....
to do some act or series of acts on the land of another, for the benefit of the licensee, without passing
any estate in the land; and when the license is to mine upon the land of another the right of property
in the minerals, when they are severed from the soil, vests in the licensee." Christensen v. Pacific
Coast Borax Co. 38 P. 127, 128 (Oregon 1894).
107. "Mere nomenclature is unimportant. 'The test to determine whether an agreement for the
use of real estate is a license or a lease is whether the contract gives exclusive possession of the
premises as against all the world, including the owner, in which case it is a lease'." Herigstad v.
Hardrock Oil Co. 52 P.2d 171, 174 (Montana 1935). In the same case, concerning the rights of
assignees under federal oil and gas prospecting permits on the public lands, Matthews, J., found
that "... it is generally held that such a 'lease' does not vest in the lessee an estate in the land or
in the oil and gas therein, but simply the right to prospect for oil and gas, 'a sort of subterranean
ferae naturae,' to which no title vests until reduced to possession by extraction from the earth; an
incorporeal hereditament." Id. See notes 118-121 and accompanying text. Swenson has noted that
"... one of the most troublesome problems in mining leases today is the extent to which either
traditional property or contract principles should govern the rights of the lessor and the lessee or
their transferees." Swenson, Development Covenants in Solid Mineral Leases, I Nat. Res. J. 271
(1961). He has suggested also that mining leases (mining agreements involving solid or hard minerals)
may be related to (and therefore derived from) traditional oil and gas leases. Id. at 272.
108. "A mere license, while it remains executory, is revocable at the pleasure of the licensor, is
indivisible and nonassignable." Stinson v. Hardy 41 P. 116, 118 (1895) (an exclusive, irrevocable
license for possession of a mining claim, under which possession may be maintained against the
world, found to be a lease). "'License' unlike 'lease' conveys no estate in affected property, and is
generally revocable at will without notice." Strandholm v. Barbey 26 P.2d 46 (Washington 1933)
(U.S. Dept. of the Army lease of tidelands and shorelands in the Columbia River for fish seining
operations found not to be a lease but a license).
109. An increase in the ability of the licensor to exercise its discretion to revoke or otherwise
modify the terms and conditions of a license will, ceteris paribus, increase uncertainty and, as a
result, the perceived private costs of development. This may be an important consideration in the
case of ocean mineral entitlements. The Ocean and the Future at 195 (cited in note 18) (prepared
statement of Richard J. Greenwald, Secretary and General Counsel, Deepsea Ventures, Inc. and
Ocean Mining Associates).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

either form of access, private firms are able to produce or recover minerals
and to profit from their sale."' In modem mining codes, both leases and
licenses can be made to exclude other prospective claimants. ," (Interestingly, a nonexclusive permit is required under OCSLA for prelease
exploration activity,"' and permits from other federal or state agencies
110. Under OCSLA, "[A]n oil and gas lease issued pursuant to this section shall ... entitle the
lessee to explore, develop, and produce the oil and gas contained within the lease area (emphasis
added) .... " OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(4) (1982). Production under OCSLA is defined as
"those activities which take place after the successful completion of any means for the removal of
minerals, including such removal, field operations, transfer of minerals to shore, operation monitoring, maintenance, and work-over drilling . .."OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1331(m) (1982). Note that
the definition of production does not specifically include the actual ownwership, sale or other use
of minerals, and these activities are not specifically authorized elsewhere in the Act. Royalty provisions, however, do apply to amounts or values of production "saved, removed, or sold." OCSLA,
43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(A) (1982). Under DSHMRA, a permit for commercial recovery ". . . recognizes the right of the holder to recover hard mineral resources and to own, transport, use, and
sell hard mineral resources recovered (emphasis added)." DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1412(b)(3) (1982).
Under the proposed NSHMA, "[ejach license or permit issued under this Act shall have attached
to it terms, conditions, and restrictions that--(A) authorize the holder of such license or permit to
process at sea, transport, use, and, in the case of a permit, sell the hard mineral resources recovered;
...(emphasis added)." NSHMA, § 308(a)(l)(A) (1988). The lack of specific authority to own,
sell, or otherwise use minerals produced on OCS leases should not be interpreted as a weaker bundle
of rights than those granted under other ocean mining codes. Such activities are implicit in an OCS
"lease" and thus go unmentioned in the Act. The inclusion of such activities specifically in the
language of DSHMRA and NSHMA may help to reduce legal uncertainty associated with "licenses"
or "permits." N.b. the absence of the term "own" in the NSHMA proposal.
Ill. See OCSLA , 43 U.S.C. §(1982); DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1412(b)(2) (1982). Laitos &
Westfall consider both federal leases and federal licenses and permits to be in the same class of
"non-vested protectible property rights." Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, II Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1,8 (1987).
112. To date, only 17 permits have been issued for prelease expoloration of ocean hard minerals
on the outer Continental Shelf. The following table summarizes information about the permits:
Mineral
Approximate
Year
No.
Permittee
Prospect
Location

1966
1966
1966
1967
1967
1969
1969
1970
1975
1986

1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2

Marine Exploration
Ocean Science & Eng.
Newport News Shipbldg.
Ocean Resources
Bear Creek Mining
Global Marine
Ocean International
Deepsea Ventures
Radcliff Minerals
DuPont

1986

2

1986
1987
1987

I
1
1

Gold Placers
Gold Placers
Phosphorites
Phosphorites
Phosphorites
Sand, Hvy. Mins.
Heavy Minerals
Mn Nodules
Sand
Heavy Minerals

Norton Sound, Alaska
Norton Sound, Alaska
North Carolina
Southern California
Southern California
New Jersey
Mid-Atlantic
Blake Plateau
West Cameron, La.
Georgia

Associated Minerals

Heavy Minerals

Georgia

Tech. Univ. of Clausthal
Inspiration Gold
Geomarex

Cobalt Crusts
Gold Placers
Carbonate Sands

Hawaii
Norton Sound, Alaska
Florida Keys

Source: Personal compilation from conversations with various regional offices of Minerals Management Service.
This list does not include 32 permits issued from 1982-1987 to seven companies in the Alaska
OCS Region for high-resolution geophysics or shallow geological investigations. These latter permits
were directed, in part, toward sand and gravel resources that might be used for the construction of
gravel islands or other support structures for offshore oil production facilities.
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may be required for postlease activities such as waste disposal and construction.' 3) It is unclear whether the legal status of the use of either a
lease or a license affects the flow of financial capital to the miner." 4

What may be of overriding interest to private firms, disregarding any
traditional differences, is the extent to which a method of access involves
iterations at which resource managers may exert discretionary power to
revoke or in some manner derogate the nature of the entitlement. Under
OCSLA the Secretary of Interior maintains a significant amount of discretion with regard to the modification or revocation of mineral leases. ,"
A recent case before the U.S. Supreme Court' concerning the scope of
intergovernmental relations in OCS oil and gas activities" 7 highlights this
discretionary authority. In Secretary of the Interior v. California,Justice
O'Connor, by extricating the act of federal OCS lease sales from the
purview of coastal state consistency review, ' declared that "by purchasing a lease, lessees acquire no right to do anything more. Under the
plain language of OCSLA, the purchase of a lease entails no right to
proceed with full exploration, development, or production that might
trigger CZMA [Coastal Zone Management Act] section 307(c)(3)(B); the
lessee acquires only a priority in submitting plans to conduct those ac-

tivities. If these plans, when ultimately submitted, are disapproved, no
further exploration or development is permitted. ""'
The association of "leasing" with access to hydrocarbon minerals on113. The final EIS for the Arctic Sand and Gravel Lease Sale details potential permit requirements
including: rights of way for common carrier pipelines on the OCS, coral protection, offshore construction, dredging and filling of navigable waters, offshore structures, and those issued under the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. Minerals Management Service, Sand and Gravel
FEIS at C-I (cited in note 6).
114. Concerning hard minerals on the onshore public lands, Hansen has suggested that a leasing
system "could affect the industry's ability to attract capital for large investments needed to develop
low grade deposits." Clinton J. Hansen, Why a Location System for Hard Minerals? Frontier Doctrine
Confronts the Computerized Society, 13 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. I, 16 (1967).
115. OCS activities are separated into prelease exploration, exploration, and development and
production. Iterations at which discretion can be exerted include requirements for a prelease exploration permit f30 C.F.R. §251 (1986)1; competitive bidding for a lease OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337
(1982); exploration plan submittal and approval [OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1340 (1982)1; a drilling
permit [OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1340(d) (1982)1; and development and production plan submittal and
approval [OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982)1.
116. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984) (Interior Department not required
to prepare "consistency determination" document before selling offshore oil and gas leases). See
Laitos & Westfall, IIHarv. Envtl. L. Rev. 34 (cited in note I ll).
117. For a good overview of issues associated generally with federalism in ocean management
and specifically with the "federal consistency" provisions of the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA), see Timothy J. Eichenberg & Jack Archer, The Federal Consistency Doctrine: Coastal
Zone Management and "New Federalism," 14 Ecol. L. Q. 9 (1987).
118. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982).
119. 464 U.S. 339. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens questioned the practical extent of
this discretionary authority: "Approval for exploration and development by the lessee is obviously
the expected and intended result of leasing; if it were not, the Secretary would not bother to lease
and the lessees would not bother to bid." 464 U.S. 372-373.
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shore and offshore and of "licensing" with access to deep seabed minerals
(as shown in Figure 2), probably is an important, though seemingly
semantic, distinction. Under OCSLA, private firms bid competitively for
leases to mineral exploration, development, and production rights (Figure
2). 20 Those miners with winning bids spend "front-end bonus" monies
after prelease exploration but before exploration, development, and production of a deposit. Under both DSHMRA and the proposed NSHMA,
licenses, which include the right to a subsequent recovery permit, are
allocated to miners on a first-come, first-serve basis."' The government
charges a fee, but receives no bonus, for the administrative costs incurred
in processing the license application. 2 2 Therefore, licenses, implying
lower private costs of access, are preferred by the ocean hard mineral
interests over leases. In the case of DSHMRA, however, several "preenactment explorers" have received licenses concurrently, so that a system
of conflict resolution of overlapping claims based on prespecified equity
factors was established.' 3 For deep seabed licenses, preenactment investments were important in determining the allocation of exploration
areas on the deep seabed. No similar conflict resolution provision has
been included in the proposed NSHMA.' 24
Sand and Gravel: A Special Case? Ocean sand and gravel deposits,
which in certain locations undoubtedly are first in line as an ocean hard
mineral commodity, ' potentially represent an exception to the OCSLA
method of competitive access. As one part of its 1983 proposed Arctic
sand and gravel lease sale, MMS suggested the grant of easements to
existing OCS oil and gas lease holders for the use of sand and gravel
resources on their lease tracts.' 26 The lease sale was not held, and the
easements were never granted. Alternatively, the State of Louisiana has
120. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
121. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1413(b) (1982); NSHMA, § 302(a) (1988).
122. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1414 (1982); NSHMA, § 305(d) (1988).
123. 15 C.FR. § 970.302 (1986). Broadus & Hoagland, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 552 (cited in note
96).
124. NSHMA, § 302(a) (1988).
125. Bureau of Mines, An Economic Reconnaissance of Selected Sand and Gravel Deposits (cited
in note 11).
126. Notice of Tentative Terms and Conditions for an Arctic Sand and Gravel Lease Sale, 48
Fed. Reg. 15,541 (1983). It is unclear whether Minerals Management Service possessed the authority
to grant easements under OCSLA. In 1959, a decision of the Interior Solicitor concluded that OCS
sulfur lessees were not entitled to the free use of salt (to be employed in the production of sulfur)
on their OCS leases. Application for Free Use of Salt Deposits for Sulphur Mining Operations on
"Section 6" Outer Continental Shelf Leases, M-36548 (Jan. 19, 1959) (unpublished solicitor's
opinion). For an interesting historical analog with a contrary result, see W.T. Morris, 51 Interior
Dec. 416 (1926) (individual permittee is an agent of the United States under the Mineral leasing
Act of 1920 and, as such, entitled to the free use of coal resources to be used as fuel in drilling a
deep test well for oil and gas on the U.S. public lands).
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requested a grant of OCS sand for use in counteracting the effects of
coastal land subsidence on its coast. 127Onshore, access to sand and gravel
resources on the U.S. public lands typically is authorized through a
competitive or noncompetitive contract sale of the resource in place. 2
Yet under the Surface Materials Act' 29 states, territories, local governments, or nonprofit corporations may receive grants of these materials

for noncommercial uses such as public works projects.'o No such provision exists in OCSLA for the federal OCS, and Louisiana's request
may not be satisfiable there.
Conservation Issues. It is useful to consider the implications for conservation of the methods of access found in existing and proposed ocean

mining codes. Invoking a number of simplifying assumptions, 3' a mining
code with the goal of conservation should work to maximize the net
present value of a mineral resource to society.'32 Interestingly, such a
condition can be realized when the mineral resource owner (here the
federal government) captures the true economic rent, or the difference
between private development costs, including uncertainty and the opportunity costs of investment, and gross revenue from the sale of the
produced mineral.' 33 One method of access, which attempts to capture a
financial rent and which is consistent with a goal of economic conservation, is to sell the mineral property to the highest bidder at an auction. ,
In cases where, legally, an actual "land" sale cannot transpire, the government still might sell "access" to the property to the highest bidder.
Out of the numerous methods by which some form of entitlement can be
sold, "' the most efficient method for practical application cannot be de127. Telephone interview with Buford R. Holt, Ofc. of Strategic and Int'l Minerals, Minerals
Management Service (April 1986). See also EEZ Hearings (cited in note 12) (prepared statement
of J. Steven Griles, Asst. Sect., Land and Minerals Management, U.S. Dept. of the Interior at 21).
128. 30 U.S.C. §602 (1982).
129. 30 U.S.C. §601-604 (1982).
130. Id.
131. The most important assumptions concern market failures, such as pollution externalities,
imperfectly competitive behavior, tax structure distortions, and freight subsidies. See Page, Conservation and Economic Efficiency at 5 (cited in note 51).
132. This is equivalent to an economic definition of the term "conservation," which will be
employed here. Russell 0. Jones, Walter J.Mead, & Philip E. Sorenson, The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 19 Nat. Res. J. 885, 893 (1979). Scott, Natural Resources:
The Economics of Conservation at 26 (cited innote 50), discusses the definitional problems associated
with the term "conservation." It should be noted that the definition used here does not necessarily
account for fundamental distributional questions of existing income distribution or intergenerational
equity.
133. McDonald, The Leasing of Federal Lands for Fossil Fuel Production 24 (cited in note 60).
134. Nelson, The Making of Federal Coal Policy 231 (cited in note 32).
135. Alternative selling methods include bonus bidding, royalty bidding, profit share bidding,
work commitment bidding and variations or combinations of these. In addition, there are different
methods of staging an auction. Mead, 3 Econ. Min. Indus. 664 (cited in note 28).
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termined on the basis of theory alone.' 36 Notwithstanding this problem,
important empirical work has suggested that, for OCS oil and gas minerals, a competitive bonus bid system is an efficient access method for a
'
goal of resource conservation. 37
Since at least 1920, several types of minerals have been leased competitively in the United States.' 3 s The minerals industries traditionally
have opposed competitive bid access systems, primarily because of the
front-end payment requirements. 9 For example, members of the oil and
gas industry opposed the competitive bidding systems that were incorporated into the Minerals Leasing Act in 1920 and OCSLA in 1953.'"

Assertions from mineral interests to the contrary,' 4 ' there is little evidence

to suggest that such a system is inappropriate in cases where the mineral
resource is well-understood and rents can be captured with some certainty. "'
136. Stephen L. McDonald, "Foreword," in Walter J. Mead, Asbjorn Moseidjord, Dennis D.
Muraoka & Philip E. Sorenson, Offshore Lands: Oil and Gas Leasing and Conservation on the Outer
Continental Shelf xxii (1985) ("Offshore Lands").
137. Id. at 45-84. In "Offshore Lands" the authors state that the most prominent problem with
competitive bonus bidding is the possibility that smaller firms might not be able to muster the
resources to make competitive bids and thus could be excluded. Id. at 45-84. This problem, if it
exists in reality, assumes imperfections in financial capital markets.
138. Perhaps the earliest leasing concerned the lead resources of the Indiana and Missouri territories. Swenson, in History of Public Land Law Development at 702 (cited in note 32); Mayer &
Riley, Public Domain, Private Dominion at 20-42 (cited in note 32); Tank, Legal Aspects of Geology
at 451 (cited in note 23).
139. EEZ Hearings (cited in note 12) (prepared Statement of Richard J. Greenwald, PresidentElect of Ocean Mining Associates and Deepsea Ventures Inc.).
140. For the Minerals Leasing Act of 1920, see C. Winter, Four Hundred Million Acres 101
(1932). For the case of OCSLA, see H.R. Rep. No. 1778. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., repr. in 1953 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 1415, 1437.
141. See Greenwald, Prepared Statement (cited in note 139). Generally, ocean hard minerals
interests base their arguments against leasing as a method of access on the following: there exist
geologic, technological, and planning horizon differences compared with the leased hydrocarbon
minerals, and traditionally the access method onshore has been a location-patent system. The mineral
differences can be better understood as based upon uncertainty, which will affect practice under any
mining code. The latter argument, based upon "tradition," may be the stonger of the two. It is
possible that administrative costs of a leasing system may have been too great to institute one for
public minerals during the second half of the nineteenth century. Swenson, in History of Public
Land Law Development at 719 (cited in note 32), postulates that it is unclear that a leasing system
would have been unworkable, because the question "had never really been studied by Congress."
142. Several researchers have outlined the rationale for a competitive bidding system for ocean
hard minerals. Broadus, Prepared Statement (cited in note 73); Mead, 3 Econ. Min. Indus. at 671
(cited in note 28); Ross D. Eckert, Exploitation of Deep Ocean Minerals: Regulatory Mechanisms
and United States Policy, 17 J. L. Econ. 143 (1974); R.H. Coase, United States Policy Regarding
the Law of the Seas, Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, Hearings on Amendment No. 946 to
. 1134 before the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d sess. 1159, 1171 (1974); Orris C. Herfindahl, Some
Problems in the Exploitation of Manganese Nodules, 7 L. Sea Inst. Proc. 28 (1972); Francis T.
Christy, Minerals of the Deep Sea, 3 L. Sea Inst. Proc. 331 (1969); Brooks, 8 Nat. Res. J. 421
(cited in note 30). Contrary to the case of offshore oil and gas, little empirical work has been
accomplished to demonstrate economic theory in the case of hard minerals. Examination of onshore
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Under either a location-patent or a license-permit system, some or all
of the economic rent, if it exists, accrues to the licensee. Thus these
systems contain encouragements for the miner that act to counterbalance
geologic or legal uncertainties. 43 The main conservation issue arising
from these methods of allocating mineral rights is that licenses are not
necessarily distributed to the most efficient producer but, instead, to the
earliest entrant.' If licenses can be assigned by one firm to another, then
this poses little problem on efficiency grounds, except for additional
negotiation costs.' 45 When this happens, the most efficient miners are
willing to bid up to the true economic rent to obtain the license from the
first licensee. Conservation is served, although the public does not receive
the rent. The license-permit systems found in both DSHMRA and the
proposed NSHMA have been formulated by the mining industry and
clearly are offspring of the location-patent system. " OCSLA and DSHMRA
permit the reassigning of licenses with government oversight, and NSHMA
provides for reassignment by the resource manager.'47
The Effect of Legal Uncertainty. Deep seabed mining is a case where,
legally, the federal government cannot sell the mineral property, the deep
seabed, because it has no ownership or legal control of the resources
there.' 4 According to the Law of the Sea Convention, the resources of
the deep seabed are considered the "common heritage of mankind.""9
Although the United States has not signed this convention,' 50 it still is
experience with the leasing of solid minerals, like phosphates, or fossil fuel minerals, like coal,
could prove useful. Compare the above sources with Harris, however, who advocates a noncompetitive leasing system for onshore hard minerals. Deverle P. Harris, "Some Issues and Principles
for the Design of Alternatives to the Location/Patent System for 'Locatable Minerals' on Public
Lands," 4 Materials and Society 67 (1980).
143. Robert H. Nelson, "The Public Lands," (Paul Portney and Ruth Haas, eds.), Current Issues
in Nat. Res. Pol'y 37 (1982). Alternative procedures that collect rents would reduce the level of
encouragement.
144. Mead, 3 Econ. Min. Indus. 650 (cited in note 28).
145. Eckert, 17 J. L. Econ. 170 (cited in note 142).
146. Ocean Manganese Nodules at 62 (cited in note 91). NSHMA provisions have been modeled
closely after DSHMRA. Greenwald, Prepared Statement (cited in note 139).
147. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1982); DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1425(b) (1982); NSHMA
§ 312(b) (1988) (cited in note 19). Provision for reassignment of licenses or permits was left out of
earlier drafts of the NSHMA bill possibly in order to preclude government oversight of transfer or
assignment, which might be considered a hindrance to sale or transfer of entitlements. See Swenson,
I Nat Res. J. 274, n. 22 (cited in note 107).
148. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1, 2; 13 U.S.T. 2312; T.I.A.S. 5200;
450 U.N.T.S. 82.
149. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, Part XI, §2, art. 136; U.N.
Doc AIConf. 61122 of Oct. 7, 1982; 21 ILM 1261, 1293.
150. As of Dec. 31, 1986, 159 nations had signed the convention, and, of these signatories, 35
have ratified it. United Nations, Office of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Status of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Law of the Sea Bulletin, at 6 (Nov. 1987).
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unable to claim ownership of deep seabed mineral occurrences. Instead,
the United States considers development of the minerals of the deep
seabed to be a "high seas freedom.''"- As a result, a system of licenses
and permits, which provide exploration and commercial recovery rights
to U.S. licensees but do not involve property right transfers, has been
established
to provide access for private firms to these high seas re52
sources. 1

There is no reason why a competitive bidding access method could
not have been employed for deep seabed licenses.' However, legal
uncertainty is inevitable under any type of access system set up by the
United States for an area that is not owned or controlled by the United
States. In this case, the encouragement inherent in the DSHMRA licensepermit system (potential rents) can be viewed as a counterbalance to legal
as well as existing geologic uncertainty.
Ocean hard mineral mining on the "national seabed" is related to the
case of deep seabed mining. The outer Continental Shelf lands are not
true "public lands" owned by the federal government and thus are not
subject to the traditional constitutionally-authorized disposal. 4 Congress,
however, in enacting OCSLA, declared that outer Continental Shelf lands
"appertain" to the United States and are subject to its "jurisdiction,
control, and power of disposition" (emphasis added). 55 Under OCSLA,
151. In enacting DSHMRA, Congress found "that exploration for and commercial recovery of
hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are freedoms of the high seas .... " DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(12) (1982). See, Theodore K. Kronmiller, Legal Regimes for Mining Hard Rock Minerals
Within 200 Miles, Proceedings Oceans '82 at 1209 (1982). Congress also found that the United
States had supported a United Nations General Assembly Resolution declaring the minerals of the
deep seabed as the common heritage of mankind but "with the expectation that this principle would
be legally defined under the terms of a comprehensive international Law of the Sea Treaty yet to
be agreed upon." DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1982). The definition of common heritage
now included in the LOS Convention, with its attendant mining code, apparently does not prevent
the United States from maintaining that deep seabed mining is a high seas freedom, irregardless of
the findings of Congress written into DSHMRA.
152. Goldie argues that deep seabed mining entitlements under DSHMRA are analogies to usufructs (the right to enjoy the "fruits" belonging to another) and are not territorial in nature. L.F.E.
Goldie, Title and Use (and Usufruct)--An Ancient Distinction Too Oft Forgot, 79 Am. J. Int'l. L.
689 (1985).
153. Unless miners consider the legal status of licenses to be inferior to that of leases, causing
increased uncertainty and associated costs and reducing true economic rent. See also, note 114.
154. The term "public lands" means any land and interest in land owned by the United States
within the several States and administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of
Land Management, without regard to how the United States acquired ownership, except--(I) lands
located on the Outer Continental Shelf; and (2) lands held for the benefit of Indians, Aleuts, and
Eskimos." FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1982). This point recently has appeared in a debate
between committees in the House of Representatives concerning legislative jurisdiction over OCSLA.
The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, in arguing for its jurisdiction over OCSLA,
claimed that the responsibility of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs over "public lands"
provided no basis for its interest in offshore lands because the OCS does not constitute "public
land." The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, H. Rep. No. 300, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
586, 591 (1985).
155. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §P332(l) (1982).
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then, the federal government can dispose of OCS minerals, through leases,

to private firms.'
According to an early version of the NSHMA proposal, the "seabed
of the United States is subject only to the jurisdiction and control of the
United States."' 57 Absent a stated congressional power of disposition, it
would be impossible under the NSHMA proposal to transfer property
rights by lease to ocean hard mineral properties on the national seabed.
Like the deep seabed, however, it appears that mining activities could
be licensed on the national seabed. This implies the somewhat unexpected
and possibly objectionable result of increased legal uncertainty associated
with a new national seabed jurisdiction, that is, a weaker national claim
than the OCS jurisdiction and control that includes the power of disposition. On a more mundane level, the absence of a congressionallyauthorized disposition power in NSHMA works to the advantage of the
hard minerals concerns who prefer licenses to leases.'
There is no reason why licenses for national seabed hard minerals could
not be issued competitively, so that access is allocated to the most efficient
producer.' 59 However, due to the relatively high level of geologic uncertainty and the current low level of industrial interest and activity in ocean
mining, expected economic rents could be low or even nonexistent. To
compensate for the lack of rents, methods other than bonus bidding that
allocate access competitively, such as profit share bidding," 6 and work
commitment bidding,' 6 ' among others, have been suggested. 62
' In general,
these methods of access impose enforcement and other administrative
costs that are not encountered in a license-permit system. Moreover, there
may not be enough commercial interest to hold a competition for enti156. See note 120 and accompanying text.
157. NSHMA, § 102(a)(5) (1987). In the amended version of the bill (NSHMA (1988)), references
to "jurisdiction and control" were deleted and emphasis was placed on the "sovereign rights and
jurisdiction of the United States within the Exclusive Economic Zone, to the extent permitted by
international law without prejudice to the policies of the United States concerning the outer Continental Shelf ,.. " NSHMA § 102(A)(1) (1988) (cited in note 19).
158. NSHMA could be redrafted to include disposal authority, but the existing distinction favors
those interests that seek a license-permit system.
159. Unless Congress determines that inducements (potential rents) should be provided for ocean
hard mineral development within the EEZ. Although mineral properties, under NSHMA legally may
not be "subject to disposition" in the EEZ, one might postulate that, with respect to citizens of other
countries, the legal uncertainty of entitlements there would be less than on the deep seabed.
160. Brooks, 8 Nat. Res. J. 421 (cited in note 30); Mead, 3 Econ. Min. Indus. 671 (cited in
note 28).
161. NAS Panel at 57 (cited in note 72). Using the case of oil shale as an example, Rooney
suggests the use of "competitive research expenditure bidding" (a type of work commitment bidding)
in situations where "considerable research, or exploration in virgin territory, is expected to be
necessary before a known mineral deposit will be economic, or the presence of mineral deposits
will be proven." Robert F. Rooney, Competitive Bidding for Mineral Leases, 8 Nat. Res. J. 650

(1968).
162. A detailed analysis of the benefits and costs of these access methods is beyond the scope
of this article. See Mead, 3 Econ. Min. Indus. 671 (cited in note 28).
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tements. Whether or not the potential administrative costs of these alternative methods exceed the "earliest entrant" potential inefficiency of

the license-permit method remains a question for further research.' 63

Revenue-Generating Measures
Rarely are public minerals allocated solely on the basis of outright

sale."6 Instead, a variety of alternative revenue-generating measures have
been employed to capture a portion of a financial rent for the public.' 65
There is little available evidence to indicate the basis for the rates or sizes
of revenue generators such as royalties and rentals. Tradition certainly
plays an important role, and there is some evidence that royalties for

leased minerals on the U.S. public lands may be based on the going
private rate at the time they are incorporated into legislation."6 Figure 3
describes revenue generating measures for existing and proposed ocean
mining codes.
OCSLA
Under OCSLA, the Secretary of Interior has the authority to determine
the most appropriate revenue-generating measures for hard minerals on
the outer Continental Shelf.'67 For OCS hydrocarbon, sulfur, and salt
minerals, bonuses are collected from competitive lease sales and royalties
are collected upon production.' The bonuses are the highest of those
bid on any particular lease area or tract, if they are above a minimum
163. At a low level of activity, the social costs of nonconservation may be small. Broadus,
Prepared Statement (cited in note 73). it is interesting to speculate that incentives could exist for
public managers to prefer access methods that incur higher administrative costs, because these
methods might increase their levels of responsibility and program budgets. See generally William
A. Niskanen, Competition Among Government Bureaus (Carol H. Weiss & Allen H. Barton, eds.),
Making Bureaucracies Work (1980). Alternatively, Nelson, The Making of Federal Coal Policy at
229 (cited in note 32), mentions that public mineral management may have an "existence value"
for progressivists.
164. Common varieties of public minerals like sand and gravel on the U.S. public lands are sold
in place. 30 U.S.C. §§601-615 (1982).
165. Discussions of alternative revenue generating mechanisms can be found in U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO), Congress Should Extend Mandate to Experiment with Alternative Bidding
Systems in Leasing Offshore Lands 92-98 (1983) and Mead, Moseidjord, Muraoka and Sorenson,
Offshore Lands (cited in note 136).
166. Interview with Thomas Walker, Director, Solid Mineral Leasing Division, Bureau of Land
Management, U.S. Dept. of the Interior (September 1986). See also Nelson, The Making of Federal
Coal Policy at 26 (cited in note 32); U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Interior Should Continue
Use of Higher Royalty Rates for Offshore Oil and Gas Leases 9 (1982).
167. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k) (1982).
168. Detailed statistical information on revenues that have been generated from ocean mineral
entitlements can be found in: Minerals Management Service, Federal Offshore Statistics (1984) (cited
in note 61).
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bid for the tract, as predetermined by the government.' 69 The royalty
levels vary: oil and gas royalties cannot be less than 12.5 percent "in
amount and value of production saved, removed, or sold" and, depending
upon the operating environment, usually are 16.7 percent. 70 In a few
limited instances, royalties on large, nearshore deposits have been as high
as 33.3 percent. 7 ' The deeper water and "frontier" tracts may carry a
lower royalty rate.' 72 Sulfur and salt lease royalties are not less than five
percent, as determined by the Secretary. ' Rentals of three dollars per
acre leased also are collected under OCSLA. 174 Subsequent to discovery

of a commercial mineral deposit, minimum (or "advance") royalties may
be charged. Similar to rentals, minimum royalties are a set charge per
acre-year, usually specified in a lease. 17' Rentals and minimum royalties
are types of performance requirements, as well as revenue generators,

and these two revenue measures will be discussed in greater depth in the
next section.
In only one case were leases issued for hard minerals (phosphorites)
under OCSLA.' 76 The leases involved bonuses of $122,000 (1961) on

six tracts totalling 30,240 acres; a royalty rate of five percent of gross
value but not less than 30 cents per short-ton; escalating rentals of 50
cents per acre-year for the first two years and one dollar per acre-year
thereafter; and minimum royalties of two dollars per acre-year. The
78
lease terms and lease form were based upon a standard OCS sulfur lease. 1
169. In 1982, minimum bids were raised from $25 to $150 per acre. The Minerals Management
Service recently has analyzed the minimum bid policies. Minerals Management Service, Analysis
of Outer Continental Shelf Minimum Bid Policies, 51 Fed. Reg. 5110 (1985) (request for comments).
For a summary of the methods used by Minerals Management Service in determining fair market
value for OCS leases, see U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Early Assessment of Interior's
Area-Wide Program for Leasing Offshore Lands, 28-42 (1985).
170. The size of the royalty and the form in which it is paid are determined by the Secretary of
the Interior. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(I)(A) (1982). See also, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Minerals
Management Service, Oil & Gas Leasing/Production Program, Annual Report/FY 1986 (1987).
171. GAO, Interior Should Continue Use of Higher Royalty Rates for Offshore Oil and Gas
Leases at 9 (cited in note 166).
172. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Oil and Gas Technologies for the
Arctic and Deepwater 156 (1985).
173. 30 C.F.R. § 202.152 (1986).
174. Telephone communication with Sandy Seim, Sales Activities Bureau Chief, Minerals Management Service, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1986).
175. 30 C.FR. §202.151 (1986).
176. On Dec. 15, 1961, sixteen phosphorite leases were offered off the coast of California on
the federal OCS through OCSLA. Collier Carbon and Chemical Corporation, a subsidiary of Union
Oil of California, obtained six leases. During exploration the firm discovered unexploded naval
ordinance on its leases. Collier terminated its operations and succeeded in obtaining a reimbursement
for the bonuses and rentals. Phosphate Lease File (cited in note 79).
177. Id. Expressed in 1987 dollars, these figures would be: bonuses of $463,491 (an average of
$77,248 per tract); rentals on all six tracts totalling $57,443 per year for the first two years (an
average of $9574 per tract) and totalling $114,885 per year thereafter (an average of $19.148 per
tract); and minimum royalties of $229,770 per year (an average of $38,295 per tract).
178. Id. Memorandum from Thomas J. Cavanaugh, Associate Solicitor, Division of Public Lands,
U.S. Dept. of the Interior to unnamed Assistant Director, Operating Services, BLM, U.S. Dept. of
the Interior (Oct. 18, 1961) (discussing the form of the phosphate lease).
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Subsequent proposals for hard mineral revenue generators have shown
considerable variety. 79 In 1983, the Gorda Ridge draft EIS mentioned

the possibility of employing "offsets" (credits) for bonuses or rentals that
might be established under leases for marine polymetallic sulfide minerals. "o For OCS oil and gas and sulfur leases, minimum royalties may

be credited against true royalty payments once production is initiated.' 8'

Since 1981, in developing its OCS hard minerals regulations, MMS did
examine the possibility of allowing documented prospecting costs to be
credited against bonuses.' 82 MMS decided to abandon the concept of
incentives for prospecting8 3 but still may consider the crediting of postlease exploration costs against rentals or bonuses. 84 In addition, MMS
has considered the deferral of bonus payments on a lease for up to a tenyear period.' 5
DSHMRA and NSHMA
Under DSHMRA, no royalties are collected, but instead a tax on the
imputed value of production is imposed. 86 The tax may be understood
generally as a royalty, in the sense that it is exacted from production,
although it may be treated differently for general corporate income tax
purposes.' 8 7 Viewed from this perspective, the U.S. seabed mining "royalty" is three-quarters of a percent of the value of production.' 8 This tax
revenue, when collected, is held in a trust fund account in the U.S.
Treasury, pending the entry into force of the Law of the Sea Convention
(LOS) for the United States. If this treaty is signed and ratified, the trust
funds will be transferred to an International Seabed Authority. 9 Although
the LOS "mining code" is not described in detail here, it is interesting
to note that its "production charge" (royalty) is between 5 and 12 percent. ' ° No other revenue generating mechanisms are employed by
179. BLM at 303-362 (cited in note 80); Minerals Management Service, Gorda Ridge DEIS at
391-140 (cited in note 7).
180. Minerals Management Service, Gorda Ridge DEIS at 400 (cited in note 7).
181. Seim, telephone communication (cited in note 174).
182. Stone & MacGillvray, 4 Circum-Pacific Energy and Min. Conf. (cited in note 9).
183. Minerals Management Service, 52 Fed. Reg. at 9761 (1987) (cited in note 25).
184. Stone & MacGillvray, 4 Circum-Pacific Energy and Min. Conf. (cited in note 9).
185. Id. Deferred bonus payments are possible for hydrocarbon leases as well. Deferred payment
schedules are published in the notice of an OCS lease sale appearing in the Federal Register. 30
C.F.R. 260. 10(a)(I)(iii)(1987).
186. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Removal Tax Act of 1979 (DSHMRTA), 26 U.S.C. §§49954498 (1982).
187. Royalties generally are treated as a deductible cost for corporate income tax purposes. Terry
S. Maley, Handbook of Mineral Law 669 (1983).
188. DSHMRTA, 26 U.S.C. §§4495(b), 4497(a) (1982) (cited in note 186) (The amount of the
tax is 3.75% of the imputed value of the resource removed. "Imputed value" means "20 percent
of the fair market value of the commercially recoverable metals and minerals." Thus the tax is
equivalent to 0.75% of production.
189. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1472(b),(d) (1982).
190. Under the LOS Convention, the seabed miner can choose between paying a production
charge only or paying a combination of the production charge and a share of net proceeds (profit
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DSHMRA, although fees are charged to cover the administrative costs
of processing license and permit applications. NOAA charged a license
fee of approximately $100,000 for each of the four exploration licenses
it issued in 1984.1'
NSHMA proposes to generate revenues with a royalty upon recovery
of hard mineral resources of 12.5 percent.' 92 The royalty would be based
upon the "gross value of the hard mineral resource at the point of severance or extraction" and, presumably, determined on an individual permit
basis. 3 In addition, the bill provides that the resource manager can
increase the royalty rate "to achieve a fair and equitable return to the
United States for the value of the rights and privileges received under
the permit" or decrease the rate either to make economic recovery feasible
' No bonuses or
or to enhance recovery for national security purposes. 94
rentals would be collected under NSHMA, but a "reasonable" administrative fee and a fee for certification would be charged for both exploration license and commercial recovery permit applications.'"
Bonanzas and Dry-Holes
If either bonus payments or outright sale of a mineral property appear
an efficient means of both achieving conservation and generating revenues
for the public, why are other forms of rent capture, such as royalties,
employed? The answer can be found in the degree of geologic uncertainty
associated with the disposal of minerals.' 96 Both the government and the
private developer face uncertainty. The government faces a kind of uncertainty that has been termed the "bonanza complex." 97 Under a pure
bonus system, if the government receives a low-bonus payment for the
sale of a mineral entitlement, and the private developer subsequently
share). Formulas for the determination of charges and shares are found at United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 6/122 of Oct. 7, 1982; 21 ILM 1261, 1330.
Annex Ill, art. 13(4), (5), (6). Other revenue generators include rentals of $1 million per year,
which can be credited against production charges or profit shares [Annex Ill, art. 13(3)] and administrative fees of $500,000 for processing applications for plans of work [Annex Ill, art. 13(3)].
191. See 15 C.F.R. §970.208 (1988).
192. NSHMA, § 308(a)(2)(A) (1988). The earlier version of the bill called for a 12.5% royalty
"based upon the profitability of commercial recovery operations." This provision resembled a profit
share arrangement. The administrative costs associated with a profit share royalty (namely the
determination of profit) are potentially high. See, Jones, Mead & Sorenson, 19 Nat. Res. J. 900
(cited in note 132).
193. NSHMA, § 308(a)(2)(A) (1988).
194. NSHMA, § 308(a)(2)(B) and § 308(a)(2)(C) (1988). It is not clear whether or not the resource
manager might have the ability to modify the royalty during the permit period.
195. NSHMA, § 305(b) and § 304(d) (1988).
196. McDonald, The Leasing of Federal Lands for Fossil Fuel Production at 38-39 (cited in note
60).
197. Herbert D. Drechsler, The Value of Subsea Mineral Resources, 6 L. Sea Inst. Proc. 115
(1971).

Summer 19881

OCEAN HARD MINERALS

discovers a bonanza (a large or high-grade deposit), then the government
may be unable to capture rent that exceeds the bonus.' Resource managers may then face political problems because of perceived "poor management" or "give-aways" of public mineral assets.'99 Thus royalties,
which capture a portion of the rent over the full production period, are
a mechanism that the government uses to hedge against the likelihood of
the appearance of unanticipated rents.
The private firm, conversely, faces the possibility that it pays a bonus
upfront but is unsuccessful in making a commercially-feasible discovery.
To handle this uncertainty, private firms usually assign a premium to their
predicted costs of mineral development." This uncertainty premium cuts
into any economic rent and thereby reduces the size of a bonus. An access
method that employs royalties provides the private firm with a hedge
against a "dry-hole" event and thus reduces the size of the uncertainty
premium (although the bonus may stay low as well)."0 ' Fixed royalty
payments increase the average cost of production uniformly over time
and act to cause premature abandonment of mineral deposits. Yet by
reducing the costs associated with uncertainty, royalties might capture a
larger portion of true economic rent than bonus payments employed alone.'
The use of a sliding scale royalty, in which royalties gradually decrease
over time and approach zero at the socially efficient point of abandonment,
theoretically captures the entire rent, although administrative costs are
potentially high.203
There may be an optimal combination of bonus payments and royalties
for each entitlement.' ° Resource managers might consider the combination of revenue generators that tend to capture the most rent and minimize uncertainties. This "flexibility" could be accomplished at several
different scales: at the lease or permit level,2 5 for each lease sale, 2'
between areas where relative geologic understanding differs,207 or over
198. Drechsler makes the cogent point that -(t)he writers of the draft (LOS Convention) ignored
the situation of no rent. The fact that there is now only small production of seabed derived mining
products tends to give an intimation that the ore may be marginal with little available rent." Id.
199. One recent example of the bonanza complex concerns the sale of federal coal in the Powder
River Basin, Montana. For a case history of this sale, which includes potential conspiracy as an
added twist, see Commission on Fair Market Value Policy for Federal Coal Leasing, Report 374
(1984).
200. This premium may by incorporated into higher requirements for private return on investment.
McDonald, The Leasing of Federal Lands for Fossil Fuel Production at 39 (cited in note 60).
201. Id. at 40.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 38.
204. Id. at 41. In fact, a "fair" market value may be hard to determine with any reasonable
amount of precision. And the assignment of an appropriate royalty rate may be just as difficult.
205. See text accompanying note 321.
206. See text accompanying note 322.
207. See text accompanying notes 323-25.
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time as learning takes place.' ° For OCS oil and gas leasing, the Secretary
of the Interior has experimented with the use of different royalty rates 2°9
and has adjusted, from time to time, the minimum bid requirements of
leases." '°

Exploration Offsets
For ocean hard minerals on the OCS, we expect no rents or only small
rents because of the high costs involved in their discovery, exploration,
and extraction relative to alternative sources of supply. OCSLA requires
the leasing of ocean hard minerals by competitive bonus bid and gives
the Secretary of the Interior discretion in the setting of a royalty. 2II Although the Secretary might consider setting a zero royalty, we expect that

the royalty will be nonzero because of the bonanza complex. However,
with little or no expected rents and with the likelihood of a royalty
structure in place designed to exact at least some rents, a competitive
bonus bid lease sale might attract little bidding interest.
Consideration by MMS of offsets or credits for documented prospecting

or exploration costs is an inventive solution to the problem of the disposal
of minerals that are believed to be only marginally productive.2 ' Under
the offset approach, private firms could include estimates of their exploration expenses in their bids and, in effect, bids would become the sum
of estimated rents and exploration costs.2"3 Nevertheless, this approach
is not necessarily consistent with a goal of economic conservation because
it cannot claim to select, in every case, the firm with the lowest combined
costs of exploration, development and production.
As shown in Figure 4, assume that all bidders have identical development and production costs and that each bidder estimates the same
gross discounted in-place value for an entitlement.21 4 As is the case with
208. See text accompanying notes 326-27. See also Broadus, Prepared Statement (cited in note
73).
209. GAO, Interior Should Continue Use of Higher Royalty Rates for Offshore Oil and Gas
Leases at 9 (cited in note 166).
210. Minerals Management Service, Analysis of Policies to Encourage Leasing, Exploration, and
Production on the Outer Continental Shelf, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,810 (1986) (request for comments).
211. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k) (1982).
212. Stone & MacGillvray, 4 Circum-Pacific Energy and Min.Conf. (cited innote 9). The concept
of offsets or credits was suggested in Minerals Management Service, Gorda Ridge DEIS at 395 and
399-400 (cited in note 7). This concept currently ,is
under study within the Interior Department and
has not yet been proposed officially as a potential approach to the leasing of ocean hard minerals.
Personal communication with Timothy J. MacGillvray, Minerals Economist, Ofc. of Strategic and
International Minerals, Minerals Management Service, Long Beach, Calif. (Jan. 8, 1987). Prelease
prospecting rules proposed by the Minerals Management Service in 1987 made no mention of offsets
or credits. Minerals Management Service, 52 Fed. Reg. at 9761 (cited in note 183).
213. Stone & MacGillvray, 4 Circum-Pacific Energy and Min. Conf. (cited in note 9).
214. This approach follows the conceptual "model of rent estimation" of Jones, Mead &Sorenson,
19 Nat. Res. J. 894 (cited in note 132). Several assumptions are necessary in this type of representation: (1) there is no uncertainty involved in determining the net present value (NPV); (2)
negotiation costs involved in hoiding a lease sale and the transfer of an entitlement are constant
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FIGURE 4
A simplified case of exploration offset bidding, where two bidders A and B make identical
estimates of the gross net present value of a lease. E, D and P represent respectively the
estimated costs of exploration, development, and production. Under a strict bonus bidding
case, without royalty charges, bidder A could bid its perceived rent as a bonus and win the
entitlement. Under exploration offset bidding, both bidders make identical bids because they
are permitted to include estimated costs of exploration in their bids.

any auction, no firm with combined exploration, development, and production costs greater than the estimated net present value of an entitlement
would submit a bid. Even though exploration costs may represent a
substantial proportion of the dollar amounts of bids, all firms would bid
both exploration costs and perceived rents, without regard to the relative
amounts of each. It is possible that a marginal firm (one who perceives
zero rent) would bid only its estimated exploration costs. As seen in
Figure 4, bidder A is more efficient because the total of its exploration
and extraction costs is less than bidder B. Yet both firms would make
identical bids because the sum of exploration costs and potential rents
are the same in each bidder's case.2" 5 In this situation the resource manager
across bidders (uniformly reduce NPV) and are not represented explicitly in the figure; (3) the royalty
faced by bidders in their decision to bid is constant and is either not represented explicitly in the
figure or is assumed to be a portion of each firm's production costs (note that the royalty charge
also might represent a social cost because it could force the premature abandonment of a deposit);
and (4) a normal profit to the firm is included in the firm's costs.
215. Note that under these conditions bidders with lower costs of development and production
would be able to outbid others and win the lease, even if their exploration costs are so high that
they perceive zero rent. (There still exists a problem in this scenario with the selection of the
inefficient firm.)
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would have to use some other criterion on which to allocate the lease. 2 i6
A bidding system that incorporates exploration offsets closely resembles
a work commitment bidding system. Under the work commitment approach, firms present their bids in the form of exploration or development
plans. (An exploration offset would be equivalent to the cost of an exploration plan but would not include the plan itself.) The resource manager
then selects the plan that is most likely to achieve the goals of the mining
code. Noncompetitive work commitments have been used in Canada, the
United Kingdom, and Norway for offshore leasing of hydrocarbon minerals. 2 7 A scheme for competitive work commitment bidding was incorporated into OCSLA when it was amended in 1978, but this type of
bidding has never been used.2" '
Where resource knowledge is lacking, work commitments appear to
be a reasonable way for resource managers to gain knowledge about
public assets, but there can be disadvantages." 9 As is the case with
exploration offsets, the primary problem is that there is no guarantee that
work commitment bidding system will select the most efficient explorer.
In fact, an incentive may exist for firms to inflate exploration costs, and
there may be significant administrative costs associated with government
monitoring of exploration expenses.22
The genius of a competitive bid system is that it is designed both to
select the most efficient miner and to collect a portion of the economic
rent for the resource owner. The use of exploration offsets would seem
most suited to the leasing of offshore deposits for which there exists little
resource information and a high degree of geologic uncertainty. Under
these conditions, it is possible that private firms would perceive no rents
or only small rents and any social costs incurred from the selection of a
firm that is not the most efficient would be minor. Indeed, if the knowledge
gained by the resource manager through the use of a bidding system that
includes exploration offsets increased the probability that the manager
would capture rents in the future, these future returns might well outweigh
the initial inefficiency losses. At the same time, this would require that
management flexibility be built into the mining code so that the resource
manager would have the ability to shift to a different method of allocating
entitlements and capturing rents on future disposals.2 2t
216. One possible criterion would be a subjective evaluation of the qualifications of the bidder.
OCSLA 43 U.S.C. § 1337(k) (1982) specifies that the Secretary of Interior may grant leases only
to "qualified persons.'" Among equally qualified bidders, established operating experience or other
criteria might be used, although there is no precedent in the Act for this kind of allocation decision.
Another alternative could be to give the winning bidders the option to explore and develop the lease
jointly.
217. OTA, Oil and Gas Technologies at 216 (cited in note 172).
218. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(G) (1982).
219. Jones, Mead & Sorenson, 19 Nat. Res, J. 904 (cited in note 132).
220. Id.
221. See notes 319-38 and accompanying text.

Summer 19881

OCEAN HARD MINERALS

Performance Requirements
Performance requirements... are another basic characteristic of a mining
code. They can be defined as a set of legal requirements incorporated
into a system for mineral disposal that require the dedication of economic
resources toward the definition and development of a mineral deposit
within a prespecified area and time period.22 The rationale behind performance requirements is that the resource "owner" (the government)
requires an expeditious return on the development of its mineral assets.
Nonperformance runs counter to the resource manager's prescribed development plan. 24 When the government wants public minerals to be
developed, performance requirements can be useful tools to assure their
development. The government might want to control the pace of ocean
hard minerals development in order to achieve the several policy goals
discussed above.225 Figure 5 identifies performance requirements and
compares them across both existing and proposed ocean mining codes.
Requirements. OCSLA, DSHMRA, and NSHMA contain requirements to conduct operations diligently, that is to apply steady, continuous
effort toward the working of a mineral deposit.226 In DSHMRA and NSHMA,
these "due diligence" requirements are outlined and explained in more
detail in the terms, conditions, and restrictions that would attach to licenses and permits.227 In all three mining codes, failure to conduct operations with due diligence could affect an operator's reputation, and
hamper his ability to obtain future development rights.22 OCSLA also
222. This section is based substantially upon: Porter Hoagland IIl, Performance Requirements in
Ocean Mineral Development, 9 Marine Policy Reports 5 (1987).
223. Performance requirements are sometimes equated with "due diligence" requirements. See
DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1418 (1982). However, performance requirements are a more general
category of requirements that encourage the employment of factors of production in mineral development and that include due diligence requirements as a subset.
224. Nelson, The Making of Federal Coal Policy at 53 (cited in note 32).
225. See notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
226. In an early case, concerning water rights, the Supreme Court of Nevada defined the term:
"Diligence is defined to be the 'steady application to business of any kind, constant effort to
accomplish any undertaking.' The law does not require any unusual or extraordinary efforts, but
only that which is usual, ordinary, and reasonable. The diligence required in cases of this kind is
that constancy or steadiness of purpose or labor which is usual with men engaged in like enterprises,
It is the doing of an act, or series
and who desire a speedy accomplishment of their designs ....
of acts, with all practical expedition, with no delay, except such as may be incident to the work
itself." The Ophir Silver Mining Company v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 546 (Helm 1868) (work to
construct a ditch for the purpose of appropriating water rights found not prosecuted with reasonable
diligence and thus subsequent attempt at appropriation held invalid).
227. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. (NOAA),
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Exploration License USA-3, Docket No. 401, Attachment A
(August 29, 1984). Exploration license applications, amendments to the applications, exploration
licenses, amendments to the licenses, and terms, conditions, and restrictions of the licenses are kept
on file at the Ofc. of Ocean Minerals and Energy, NOAA, Washington, D.C.
228. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1982); DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1413(c)(3) (1982); NSHMA
§ 304(b)(4) (1988) (cited in note 19).
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FIGURE 5
Performance Requirements in Ocean Hard Mineral Entitlements
OCSLA

DSHMRA

HR. 5464

Due Diligence
Bond

yes
$50,000 per lease or
$300,000 per
"area"

none

none

Rental/
Minimum Royalty

$741/sq km/year

none

none

Term

5-10 years for
exploration,
production limited
only by ability to
produce in paying
quantities (or
drilling or wellreworking
conducted)

10 years plus
extensions for
exploration, 20 years
for commercial
recovery or more if
commercially
feasible

10 years plus one
extension for
exploration, 20
years for
commercial
recovery or more if
commercially
feasible

Area

23 sq km or as
determined by the
public manager
proposed in 1974
for phosphorites and
sand/gravel

variable, but
approximately
150,000 sq km

unlimited?

possible through
transition from
license to permit
within "logical
mining unit"
exploration and
commercial recovery
exploration and
commercial recovery

possible through
transition from
"logical exploration
unit" to "logical
recovery unit"
exploration only

Partial
Relinquishment

Expenditure
Requirements

none

Plans

exploration and
development/
production

Reports
Affect on
Reputation

monthly operations

annual

exploration and
commercial
recovery
none
yes

*(Current performance requirements for OCS hydrocarbon minerals).

requires the posting of performance bonds of $50,000 per lease or $300,000
per leasing area, which could be forfeited if the posting firm is nondiligent.229
All three existing or proposed mining codes limit the period of time
in which exploration and development and production (or commercial
recovery) may occur.230 DSHMRA and NSHMA allow extensions for
exploration activity upon approval from the resource manager. 3 Each
229. 30 C.F.R. §256.58 (1987).
230. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (1982); DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1417 (1982); NSHMA
§ 309 (1988).
231. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1417(a) (1982); NSHMA § 309(a) (1988).
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mining code allows production or commercial recovery to continue as
long as commercially viable.232 Although not technically a performance
requirement, area size limits define the locus of activities subject to
performance requirements. Oil and gas lease tracts are limited under
OCSLA to 23km2 but can be enlarged at the discretion of MMS or to
unitize tracts over one pool.233 DSHMRA "logical exploration units" are
.
not limited specifically, but existing licenses average about 150,000km2 234
NSHMA apparently has no limit to the size of exploration areas (except
perhaps the size of the national seabed235). Presumably, the resource
manager would decide an appropriate logical exploration or recovery unit
on the national seabed.236 The Department of the Interior's 1974 draft
EIS on OCS Hard Mineral Mining Operating and Leasing Regulations
did suggest the use of gradual area relinquishment from exploration (36
blocks) to development (9 blocks) to production (3 blocks).237 Gradual
relinquishment, which forces the developer to identify the most promising
deposits within a certain time period, is a true performance requirement.
In differentiating exploration areas from commercial recovery areas,
DSHMRA and NSHMA may contain implicit relinquishment requirements."23
Because they include detailed descriptions of activities that may be or
have been performed, plans and reports also are considered as performance requirements. OCSLA requires exploration plans and combined
development and production plans to be submitted and approved by MMS. 9
Monthly operations reports must also be filed. 2" DSHMRA and NSHMA
require exploration and commercial recovery plans to be approved by the
resource manager prior to undertaking these activities.24 Under DSHMRA
regulations, U.S. deep seabed licensees must conform "reasonably" to
their exploration plans.242 Determination of reasonable conformance by
NOAA occurs retrospectively, although NOAA maintains the right to
berth observers on exploration cruises. 43 In making its determination,
NOAA may consider "legitimate periods of time when there is no or
very low expenditure." 2' Additionally, DSHMRA regulations require
232. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (1982); DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1417(b) (1982); NSHMA
§309(b)(1) (1988).
233. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(I) (1982).
234. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(D),(2)(E) (1982).
235. NSHMA § 305(a)(4),(5) (1988).
236. Broadus, Prepared Statement (cited in note 73).
237. BLM, 1974 Proposed Regulations DEIS at 254 (cited in note 80).
238. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(E) (1982); NSHMA § 305(a)(5) (1988).
239. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1340(a),(b),(c)(e), 1351 (1982).
240. 30 C.F.R. § 250.93 (1987).
241. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (1982); NSHMA §303 (1988).
242. 15 C.F.R. §970.602(c) (1988).
243. Id.; DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1424 (1982).
244. 15 C.F.R. §970.602(c) (1988).
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annual reports of activity. Licensed deep seabed explorers must submit
an annual report to NOAA demonstrating reasonable conformance to their
activity and expenditure schedule.245
Only OCSLA requires rentals or minimum royalties to be paid on a
lease.246 Private developers may credit minimum royalties against royalty
payments.247 But rentals force firms to move toward production sooner
than they might in their absence and so are true performance requirements,
as well as revenue generators for the government. DSHMRA requires
licensees to make "periodic reasonable expenditures," but these may be
determined by the licensee and certified by NOAA. 24 s NOAA's proposed
commercial recovery regulations also will require periodic reasonable
expenditures, although this was not specified as a requirement for permittees under the Act.249 NSHMA does not require periodic expenditures
for exploration or recovery.250
Performance as Public Conservation. For public minerals, owned
or in some sense controlled by the government, performance requirements
are, in a very real sense, a directed allocation of factors of production.
This allocation responds to the institutional requirements of a mining code
that are independent of private development decisions. Because of this
direction, there exists a risk of allocating these resources too rapidly.25
Should this happen, significant opportunity costs that preclude investment
of capital and labor resources in other, more productive endeavors, like
onshore mining, could be incurred. Private mineral developers will resist
these opportunity costs, if they are perceived to increase their costs of
operation. As a result, the government may have to encourage a developer
to begin operations earlier or to continue marginal operations. In addition,
the government may252confront higher enforcement costs in attempting to
ensure performance.
245. 15 C.F.R. §970.901(b) (1988).
246. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(6) (1982); 30 C.F.R. §202.151 (1987).
247. Seim, telephone communication (cited in note 174).
248. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1418(b) (1982); 15 C.F.R. §970.602(c) (1988).
249. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Deep Seabed Mining Regulation for
Commercial Recovery Permit, 51 Fed. Reg. at 26,814 (1986) (cited in note 25).
250. NSHMA does require that licensees or permittees "pursue diligently" activities proposed in
exploration or commercial recovery plans. NSHMA § 308(a)(1)(C) (1988).
251. Resources could be allocated too rapidly through either public or private decisions. It is
assumed here, however, that the government does not stand to lose as much as a private firm in the
event that it allocates economic resources too rapidly and, partly as a result, the government will
not engage the necessary technical expertise to be able to respond to market signals as quickly or
effectively as private firms.
252. Such a situation may have occurred with onshore oil and gas minerals. An analysis conducted
by the U.S. General Accounting Office discovered uncollected minimum royalty payments for onshore
leases in 1985. The Minerals Management Service stated, when confronted with this discovery, that
minimum royalty payments are not monitored at present and will not be monitored "because it would
require too many resources to be cost effective." U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Mineral
Revenues: Opportunities to Increase Onshore Oil and Gas Minimum Royalty Revenues (1986).
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Speculation and Private Conservation. An often cited rationale for
performance requirements is to prevent "speculation." The legislative
history to DSHMRA, for example, reveals that government officials were

interested in using performance requirements as tools for discouraging

speculation.253 This justification is probably misleading. Speculation, a
term which over the years has become perjorative, is in reality only private
"conservation" of mineral resources. 4 Speculation represents an allocation of economic resources in response to market signals, rather than
institutional directives. Because private firms succeed or fail on their
abilities to respond to these signals, it is possible that private (as opposed
to public) conservation is more likely to allocate economic resources so
as to minimize waste.255
Experience with Performance in Deep Seabed Mining. Because
performance requirements are triggered upon receipt of a mineral entitlement, the case of deep seabed mining does provide limited insight into
the behavior of private firms that face performance requirements for ocean
hard minerals. In August and October, 1984, NOAA issued four exploration licenses to four industrial seabed mining consortia (Figure 6).256
The DSHMRA performance requirements are flexible enough to permit
private conservation. Indeed, NOAA has relied upon private firms with
specialized expertise in economic geology, mining engineering, oceanography, industrial R&D, metallurgy, and marine transportation to make
conservation decisions. Already two consortia have amended their U.S.
253. In a joint letter to the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee prior to the enactment
of the DSHMRA, the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce explained that "even though deep seabed
exploration and production are likely to be in an experimental mode for the near future, we believe
that the developer should have a legal obligation to pursue exploration and development diligently.
This would help prevent detrimental speculation." 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1624.
254. Nelson, The Making of Federal Coal Policy at 52 (cited in note 32). In a case unrelated to
the policy issues of public minerals but nevertheless providing an interesting observation on the
meaning of speculation, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said:
". . People will endeavor to forecast the future and to make agreements according
to their prophecy. Speculation of this kind by competent men is the self-adjustment
of society to the probable. Its value is well known as a means of avoiding or
mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices and providing for periods of want. It is
true that the success of the strong induces imitation by the weak, and that incompetent
persons bring themselves to ruin by undertaking to speculate in their turn. But
legislatures and courts generally have recognized that the natural evolutions of a
complex society are to be touched only with a very cautious hand, and that such
coarse attempts at a remedy for the waste incident to every social function as a
simple prohibition and laws to stop its being are harmful and vain ......
Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 247 (1905)
(property rights in price quotations from futures markets held to be unaffected by their limited
distribution or their content; limited distribution of the quotations found not to be a restraint of trade).
255. Nelson at 230 (cited in note 32).
256. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., Deep Seabed Mining
Report to Congress 9 (1985).
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FIGURE 6
U.S. Deep Seabed Licensee Performance'

Licenses
Term
Approximate Area
(000km )
Original
Planned
Expenditure

Ocean
Minerals
Company
(OMCO)

Ocean
Mining
Associates
(OMA)

Ocean
Management
Incorporated
(OMI)

Kennecou
Consortium
(KCON)

one
(two sites)
1984-94
169

one

one

one

1984-94
150

1984-94
113

1984-94
65

undisclosed

13.000

54,000

6,200

reduced
but
undisclosed

13.000
(same)

4,6006,600

undisclosed

1,196

164

121

undisclosed

1,020

ISO

135

undisclosed

267

164

(000 us $)
Modified
Planned
Expenditure

5962

(000 us $)
First Year
Expenditure

(000 us $)
Second Year
Expenditure

(000 us $)
Third Year
Expenditure
(000 US $)

63

'OMI holds an additional exploration license under authorization of the West German government
and KCON holds an additional exploration license under authorization of the British government.
These two consortia are also subject to performance requirements under those licenses.
2
Requested credit of more than $5 million against original planned expenditure based upon information
collected during international conflict resolution.

exploration licenses to delay originally-planned exploration activity. 2" As
the resource manager, NOAA has determined that the proposed expenditures of each consortium in its exploration plan meets the statutory and
regulatory definition, although there have been reductions in the level of
257. Ocean Minerals Company (OMCO) has eliminated at-sea survey cruises that were to be
conducted during the first five years of its license and postponed testing of new survey systems to
the second half of the license period. OMCO stillplans to file for a commercial recovery permit by
1994. Ocean Management Incorporated (OMI) has divided its exploration plan into two stages. The
first stage will involve exploration of "prime" areas within its larger license area, and the exploration
of other "nonprime" areas will be postponed. OMI reduced its planned expenditures from a previously-announced $21 million to $4.6-6.6 million, cut its planned ship time from 310 to a maximum
of 180 days, and will not test new survey systems. Both consortia have explained that resource
information obtained through an international conflict resolution process, which resolved overlapping
seabed exploration area claims, has allowed this reallocation of exploration activity. The Kennecott
Consortium (KCON) has requested a credit against its originally-planned exploration expenditures
based upon information received from conflict resolution. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Deep Seabed Mining; Proposed Revision of Exploration License, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,611
(1987) (notice and request for comments).
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expenditures.25 The consortia can make or modify these expenditures
freely, since there may be periods of no expenditure 2 9 and since reasonable conformance with exploration plans is determined retrospectively.26
Moreover, NOAA has approved already the modifications in two exploration plans,26' and additional modifications in the form of five-year exploration period extensions are possible."' Upon issuance of a commercial
recovery permit, NOAA's proposed regulations will allow another tenyear period prior to the initiation of recovery activities." 3
Information Management
Among those issues that concern ocean hard minerals, the treatment
of resource information is probably the most salient. Information has
relatively greater importance for many ocean hard minerals because of
the preliminary understanding that exists.2 Under either leasing or licensing systems, resource information is valuable to private firms that
seek access to mineral entitlements. Under OCSLA, information is important to resource managers who estimate fair market value.
Resource information is generated in all phases of mineral development
from prospecting through exploration, development, and production. Information generated at any stage can reduce geological uncertainty and
lower the costs of mineral recovery. However, we concern ourselves here
primarily with the management of information generated prior to a decision to initiate commercial recovery operations. This includes information collected through basic scientific research, government-sponsored
geological research and resource assessment, and private prospecting and
exploration efforts. As shown in Figure 2, resource information is generated prior to or after the award of an exclusive entitlement. For ease
of explication, the term "exploration" is used here to describe efforts of
private firms to generate resource information.
Mining Code Provisions. According to OCSLA, resource information
gathered by private firms under nonexclusive G&G permits, and under
exclusive leases, can be kept proprietary and confidential.265 OCSLA
258. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Deep Seabed Mining; Approval of Exploration License Revision; Ocean Minerals Co., 50 Fed. Reg. 37,394 (1985) (notice); National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Deep Seabed Mining-Proposed Revision of Exploration
License, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,884 (1986) (notice).
259. 15 C.F.R. §970.602(c) (1988).
260. Id.
261. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,394 (1985) (cited in
note 258); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,884 (1986) (cited
in note 258).
262. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1417(a) (1982).
263. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1417(b) (1982).
264. See generally James M. Broadus & Robert E. Bowen, Developing a U.S. Research Strategy
for Marine Polymetallic Sulfides, 17 Ocean Dev. and Intl. L. 91 (1986).
265. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1352 (c) (1982).
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regulations also permit group participation in prelease test drilling activities. 2' However, resource information must be made accessible to resource managers upon request.267 MMS holds confidential for variable
periods all privately-generated information obtained under nonexclusive
G&G permits. After the expiration of these periods, resource information
becomes available to the public. 26 In the event that any prelease drilling
activity discovers a significant hydrocarbon occurrence, MMS must publish the discovery but in such a way as to protect the proprietary nature
of the find. 269
For potential bidders, proprietary information concerning the nature of
the resource carries with it an advantage with respect to other bidders in
the bidding process. Resource information helps the bidder gauge more
accurately the potential revenues and opportunity costs associated with a
mineral entitlement. Firms with the advantage of resource knowledge
might bid less than the true economic rent in order to capture a portion
of the rent for themselves. This concern, that resource information could
be used to deprive the government of economic rent, drives an administratively-costly management process of garnering resource information,
calculating minimum bids, and, in some cases, setting royalties.27 Depending upon the type of information, MMS holds confidential for variable periods privately-generated information obtained through exploration
" ' The proposed
on a lease. 27
OCSLA ocean hard mineral prospecting regulations propose up to a 20-year period during which resource information
generated by private firms will be kept confidential.272 In addition to
private exploration efforts, OCSLA directs the Interior Department to
gain knowledge about hydrocarbon reserves, resources, productive ca73
pacity, and production available to meet energy supply emergencies.1
Both DSHMRA and NSHMA allow for open prospecting activities and
the grant of exclusive rights to information, resources, and partial rents
through license-permit systems.2"' Under DSHMRA, resource informa266. 30 C.F.R. §251.6-3 (1987).
267. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1352 (a)(l)(A) (1982).
268. 30 C.F.R. §251.14-1 (1987). The Minerals Management Service has changed its rules
governing the protection of geological and geophysical information obtained under a permit, extending the length of the confidentiality periods from 10 to 25 years for geophysical "information"
and from 10 to 50 years for geophysical "data." Minerals Management Service, Geological and
Geophysical Explorations of the Outer Continental Shelf, 53 Fed. Reg. 4390 (1988) (final rule). It
is expected that this rule would apply primarily to oil and gas minerals, but apparently there is
nothing in the Federal Register notice that limits the scope of this change only to those minerals.
269. 30 §C.F.R. 251.14-1(c)(I) (1987).
270. See for example, Nelson, The Making of Federal Coal Policy at 196 (cited in note 32).
271. 30 C.FR. §250.3 (1987),
272. Minerals Management Service. 52 Fed. Reg. at 9760 (1987) (cited in note 25).
273. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1865 (1982).
274. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1412 (b)(2) (1982); NSHMA § 301 (c)(2) (1988). Note: NSHMA
does not speak specifically to the nature of pre-entitlement prospecting activity
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tion is not critical in the government allocation of access to exploration
licenses. 75 However, deep seabed miners will have to demonstrate that
the resource characteristics of a site are sufficient to sustain a 20-year

production in order to obtain a commercial recovery permit.276 Some
information required of private firms by NOAA under DSHMRA is kept
confidential but is not used by the government for resource evaluations
in order to capture rents.277 As a type of intellectual property, resource
information was traded by deep seabed mining firms to facilitate the
resolution of overlapping exploration area claims.278 DSHMRA also authorizes NOAA to act as a public explorer through the use of "stable
reference areas" for, among other things, the purposes of resource evaluation."'

Similar to DSHMRA, the proposed NSHMA includes a requirement
that geologic and resource assessment information be contained in an
application for commercial recovery of ocean hard minerals." ° Upon
certification by the resource manager, license and permit applications are
to be published in the Federal Register.2 ' Access to exploration entitlements is not determined competitively, and thus resource information
would play a minimal role in their allocation under NSHMA. The proposed NSHMA would provide for a comprehensive research program to
be conducted by government agencies, which would include assessing
"the extent and nature of hard mineral resources" and encouraging "industrial sponsored studies of the resource potential."" 2
Information Spillovers
There are two general side-effects of the activity of information gathering that can affect the economic conservation of ocean minerals. 3 The
first suggests that too little effort will be involved in exploration and that
it will proceed too slowly, and the second suggests that too much effort
275. Resource assessment of the nodules has been conducted at a broad scale by government
agencies and at a finer scale by the seabed mining consortia. See generally Broadus, 235 Sci. 857
(cited in note 10).
276. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(E)(ii)(1) (1982).
277. Licensees and permitees are required to furnish resource information to the government.
DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1423 (1982). Presumably, this helps public managers monitor the degree
to which the Act's policy goals are achieved. See notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
278. Broadus and Hoagland, 21 San Diego L, Rev, 553 (cited in note 96).
279. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1419(f)(4) (1982).
280. NSHMA, §303 (b)(4) (1988). Presumably this information would be analyzed to help
determine an appropriate royalty rate. NSHMA, § 308 (a)(2) (1988).
281. NSHMA § 304(e) (1988).
282. NSHMA § 201(a) (1988). The bill would require the resource manager to disseminate "nonproprietary information" on the resources of the seabed. NSHMA § 201(d) (1988). The earlier draft
provided that the research program evaluate the "extent and value" of hard mineral resources.
NSHMA § 201(a) (1987).
283. Eckert, 17 J.L. Econ. 154 (cited in note 142).
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will be involved in exploration and that it will proceed too quickly. In
the first case, known as the information "spillover" or "leak," difficulties
in holding information confidential may cause firms to delay or underinvest in exploration.2"4 This could happen because of the "public good"
nature of information. There is little incentive for a firm to explore if it
expects that the efforts of other firms will result in the generation of
information concerning the occurrence, distribution, or grade of minerals
that the first firm can obtain at low cost. 5 Spillovers or leaks can occur
through industrial intelligence gathering, employee transfers, publiclyvisible acts of sampling or drilling, or merely the slow accumulation of
resource information on a particular deposit by other firms. One recent
example is the coastal state leasing of ocean hydrocarbon minerals on
submerged lands located near the state-federal offshore boundary in the
Gulf of Mexico. Federal revenue generation on OCS leases there benefited
from earlier state leasing activity, and this was reflected in the relatively
large size of bonuses received on the federal leases.286
Because of the potential for underproduction of information, there are
conservation-oriented justifications for encouraging a greater level of exploration effort. The most appropriate method for encouragement is not
immediately apparent, however. The allocation of economic rents, exemplified in DSHMRA and NSHMA, both of which deliver portions of
potential rents to private firms in order to encourage exploration and
development activity, among other things, is one method. Increasing the
stringency of performance requirements could achieve the same end; this
also might involve trading-off economic rents or, in the extreme, outright
public subsidy of exploration effort. Tax incentives are used to encourage
exploration activity,27 and, depending upon the mineral, varying amounts
of percentage depletion allowances that apply to production also could
induce exploration. 8
Modification of the size of the lease tract or license area is another
284. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), An Analysis of the Feasibility of
Separating Exploration from Production of Oil and Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf 28-33, 74
(1975).
285. Id. at 75. See also Rooney. 8 Nat. Res. J. 655 (cited in note 161); Eckert, 17 J. L. Econ.
155 (cited in note 142).
286. State of Texas v. Secretary of Interior, 580 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Tex. 1984) (OCSLA's "fair
and equitable" standard for distribution of 8(g) lease revenues received on federal leases within 3
miles of the Texas territorial sea found to include "enhancement in value" of federal tracts resulting
from prior offshore leasing in state waters). Also see Louisiana v. Watt, 631 F. Supp. 648 (E.D.
La. 1985). See generally Jeffrey J. Leitzinger & Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Information Externalities in
Oil and Gas Leasing," 5 Contemp. Pol'y Issues 44 (1984).
287. John C. Siegesmund III & John R. Maxfield, Demystifying the Tax Aspects of Development
and Depletion, 31 Proc. Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 4.02[2[al (1985).
288, Id. at 4.04(2) (1985). Anderson suggests that, although it applies to production, percentage
depletion encourages exploration by making mineral discoveries more valuable. Robert C. Anderson,
Federal Mineral Policy: The General Mining Law of 1872, 16 Nat. Res. J. 601, 607 (1976).
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method. Both the proposed OCSLA regulations2"9 and the proposed
NSHMA 2" leave open the question of the size of entitlements, presumably
to be determined on a case by case basis through negotiation between
the resource manager and the applicant. An interesting, yet unanswered
question for research concerns the relationship between the size necessary
to prevent information spillover and the optimal size of a production unit.
This relationship should vary with the existing level of geologic uncertainty. For example, an initially large area for exploration could obviate
information spillovers. But a performance requirement that requires a
portion of the entitlement area to be relinquished has the potential for
forcing exploration too rapidly in the absence of spillovers. Of course,
exploration might reveal a mining unit larger than the initial exploration
area, in which case this kind of performance requirement works even
more adversely. NSHMA (modeled after DSHMRA in this regard291)
apparently considers such an eventuality by distinguishing "logical exploration unit" from "logical recovery unit" and by not specifying relative
sizes of the two types of entitlements.292
Under OCSLA, information is kept confidential in order to encourage
exploration for hydrocarbon minerals. The draft ocean hard mineral prospecting regulations have proposed lengthening this confidentiality period.
Like a patent on an invention, confidentiality creates a monopoly over
the use of the information, and the possibility of obtaining this monopoly
is used as an inducement for private exploration efforts. Unlike a patent
and more like a trade secret, however, the information is not widelydisclosed. One major drawback to allowing information to be privatelyheld in this manner is that the benefits that could accrue to other users
of information go unrealized. Information leaks erode the information
monopoly, and thus benefit a wider group but, at the same time, reduce
the incentive for individual exploration.293 Because of leaks, one might
expect that information protection would be an effective inducement for
only a relatively short period of time.294
Under agreement, OCS hydrocarbon explorers may share the costs of
drilling shallow test wells or deep stratigraphic test wells. 9 5 Ostensibly
289. Minerals Management Service, 52 Fed. Reg. at 9762 (cited in note 25).
290. NSHMA § 305(a)(4) (1988).
291. DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(E) (1982).
292. NSHMA § 305(a)(5) (1988).
293. See generally J. Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics of Uncertainty and InformationAn Expository Survey, 26 J. Econ. Lit. 1375, 1404 (1979). Dodds and Bishop argue for the public
release of all mineral information. Daniel Dodds & Richard C. Bishop, On the Role of Information
in Mineral Exploration, 59 Land Econ. 411 (1983).
294. "Common lore in the (OCS oil and gas) industry is that there is no such thing as a 'tight
hole.' That is, information about a new discovery always leaks out." Leitzinger and Stiglitz, 5
Contemp. Pol'y Issues 49 (cited in note 286).
295. 30 C.F.R. §251.6-3 (1987).
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these cost-sharing exploration activites are authorized to reduce duplicative exploration efforts. 2 However, because information resulting from
these tests is shared among the participants (and may be shared later
among other firms who pay an additional premium for the information297 ),
group exploration is another method for encouraging exploration that
might not be conducted by firms acting individually. The results of deep
stratigraphic tests are held confidential for 25 years but are publiclydisseminated in the event a lease is issued within 50 geographic miles of
the test hole.29 Although group exploration activities have not been proposed for ocean hard minerals under either OCSLA or NSHMA, this
concept certainly deserves further attention. 2
NSHMA proposes a major government research program, with the
public release of information, as one means to compensate for underexploration. As shown in Figure 7, this research program would add to
existing government "exploration" efforts.o The government funds basic
oceanographic research that leads to mineral discoveries, such as the
marine massive sulfide deposits at oceanic spreading centers. 3"' In 1986,
the Department of the Interior spent an estimated $25 million on offshore
geologic surveys." °2 Furthermore, on a broad scale, the U.S. government
conducts "economic geological" research on a wide variety of minerals
both onshore and offshore. 3 Good examples include current research on
the massive sulfides of the Gorda Ridge3" and the cobalt-rich ferromanganese encrustations on Pacific islands and seamounts. °5 Except for certain classes of information collected from private explorers, information
296. 30 C.F.R. § 251.6-3(a) (1987). See notes 307-13 and accompanying text.
297. 30 C.FRR. §251.6-3(a) (1987).
298. Minerals Management Service, 53 Fed. Reg. 4390 (1988) (cited in note 268). Twenty-three
deep stratigraphic test wells have been drilled since 1974. These tests usually are conducted in areas
where it is believed that there may be little chance of discovering hydrocarbons. However, in 1978
one test conducted off Point Conception, Calif. did discover significant "shows" of crude oil.
299. See Mark Isaac, The Value of Information in Resource Exploration: The Interaction of
Strategic Plays and Institutional Rules, 14 J. Envtl. Econ. Mgmt. 313 (1987).
300. Porter Hoagland Ill & James M. Broadus, Seabed Material Commodity and Resource
Summaries 85 (1987).
301. Gregory McMurray, The Gorda Ridge Technical Task Force: A Cooperative Federal-State
Approach to Offshore Mining Issues, 5 Marine Mining 467 (1986).
302. Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology, Committee on the
Oceans and Atmosphere, Subcommittee on Marine Research, Federal Marine Science Budget Summary FY 77-86 at 42 (1985).
303. A good, comprehensive summary of marine economic geology is V.E. McKelvey, Subsea
Mineral Resources (1986).
304. R.A. Zierenberg & R.A. Koski, Form and Composition of Sediment-Hosted Sulfide-Sulfate
Deposits, Escanaba Trough, Southern Gorda Ridge, 67 EOS: Transactions of the American Geophysical Union 1282 (1986) (abstract); Gorda Ridge Technical Task Force, Gorda Ridge Symposium
Program (1987) (includes abstracts of presentations, some of which discuss the sulfide deposits of
the Gorda Ridge).
305. Frank T. Manheim, Marine Cobalt Resources, 232 Sci. 600 (1986).
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FIGURE 7
Estimated U.S. federal government expenditures on marine nonliving resources: 1966-1986.
Dollar figures expressed in millions of 1983 U.S. constant dollars. "Total nonliving resources"
include oil and gas and ocean hard minerals. "Nonfuel resources" include only ocean hard
minerals. Expenditures are equivalent to total program costs, which include funding for environmental research, environmental impact statements, lease sales, and resource assessment,
among other things.

generated by government agencies is publicly available. The National
Geophysical Data Center in Boulder, Colorado serves as a depository for
information on ocean mineral resources.'
With government exploration, two problems that have implications for
conservation arise. First, there are opportunity costs associated with directing public exploration effort into ocean minerals as opposed to some
other public activity. For example, government exploration efforts might
divert public resources away from monitoring and controlling environmental effects. Second, given appropriate motivation, private firms with
specialized expertise in ocean exploration, who exist on the basis of their
ability to respond to market signals, are likely to be more efficient explorers than public agencies. In considering public exploration, the government should consider these conservation issues and compare them to
the costs of private underexploration and the incentives that might be
necessary to induce private efforts.
306. National Geophysical Data Center, A Computerized Data Base and Bibliography on Marine
Minerals, Marine Minerals Data (Data Announcement 87-MGG-06) (1987). This publication contains
a schedule of charges for outputs from the database.
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Discovery Rushes
Historically, most mining codes have contained provisions that motivate
exploration either to achieve specified policy goals or to counteract the
effects of information spillovers. More recently, attention has been given
to the situation where there is a "rush" to discover and too much effort
is devoted to exploration. The 1872 Mining Law has been criticized for
encouraging an overinvestment in exploration, because entitlements under
this mining code are contingent upon the discovery of a valuable mineral
deposit.3 7 In part because information is not disseminated widely, explorers may perceive individual net benefits of additional exploration
effort on public lands or for public resources, particularly in areas that
already have been explored. Thus a mining code that permits private firms
to conduct exploration prior to the transfer of entitlements could result
in a form of "common pool" resource misallocation.'
The traditional method of correcting the inefficiencies of excessive
exploration effort is to assign exclusive rights to mineral developers prior
to exploration. OCSLA ameliorates discovery rushes by auctioning-off
rights to explore and exploit, and in theory the most efficient mineral
developers are willing to bid the most to capture these rights.' (Some
observers, however, believe that, prior to a lease sale under OCSLA, an
overinvestment in exploration might occur because more than one firm
can obtain geological and geophysical information on the same lease, but
only one firm will end up winning the rights to conduct detailed exploration on the lease." ' Thus exploration effort invested by losing bidders,
which sometimes is only the cost of purchasing information from a firm
specializing in geophysical activities and interpreting the information, is
wasteful. This is the primary rationale behind the regulations that allow
firms to share the costs of shallow test wells and deep stratigraphic tests.)
DSHMRA and NSHMA do not make the issuance of exploration licenses contingent upon discovery. Thus, on the surface, they appear to
obviate overinvestments in information.3" ' Both mining codes offer po307. Anderson has observed this situation under the location-patent system for onshore public
lands. Anderson, 16 Nat. Res. J. 601 (cited in note 288).
308. Hirshleifer & Riley, 26 J. Econ Lit. 1404 (cited in note 293). Eckert, 17 J. L. Econ. 162
(cited in note 142), makes the point that it is the nonexclusive nature of the right to explore that
results in the potential for overinvestment in exploration.
309. Mead, Moseidjord, Muraoka & Soenson, Offshore Lands at 48 (cited in note 136).
310. Mason suggests that overexploration could occur under a leasing system in which information
is held confidential. Charles F. Mason, Exploration, Information, and Regulation in an Exhaustible
Mineral Industry, 13 i. Envtl. Econ. Mgmt. 153, 154 and n. 5 (1986). See also Darius W. Gaskins,
Jr. & Thomas J. Teisberg, An Economic Analysis of Presale Exploration in Oil and Gas Lease Sales
(Robert T. Masson & P. David QuaIls, eds.), Essays on Industrial Organization in Honor of Joe S.
Bain 241 (1976). These observers suggest that, although too much investment in exploration could
occur, allowing exploration prior to the assignment of rights (resulting in lower uncertainty to riskadverse firms) may be the "only feasible way" for the most efficient bidders to be selected. Gaskins
& Tiesberg at 249.
311. See note 121 and accompanying text.
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tential rents to the explorer as encouragements to counterbalance information spillovers.3 2 Under these two mining codes, however, there could
be a "rush" to obtain exploration entitlements, and there is no mechanism
to ensure that the most efficient firms will obtain those rights.3" 3
Balancing Information and Revenue Generation
Some commentators have considered methods by which rents could be
traded away by the government in order to encourage exploration but at
the same time allocate entitlements competitively." 4 In this regard, one
observer has suggested a competitive "research expenditure" bidding
system,315 analogous to the exploration cost offset approach under consideration by MMS for the disposal of ocean hard minerals under OCSLA.3 16 Under such a scenario, explorers (researchers) bid away economic
rent in the form of an exploration program. The implications for economic
conservation
of the exploration offset approach have been discussed al317
ready.
At some future point, geological uncertainty might be reduced to the
point that there would be little need to encourage additional exploration
effort by trading-off rents.31 At this time, the system could be switched
from a competitive exploration expenditure system to a competitive bonus
bid system, and financial rents might then be collected. A determination
of the switch point would be a difficult decision for the government. It
might be made on the basis of increases in industrial interest in obtaining
entitlements, as a signal of rents appearing due to lower uncertainty costs
(more knowledge). Switching from one competitive method to another
raises the issue of increased legal uncertainty created through modification
of the disposal system.
MANAGEMENT FLEXIBILITY AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
Several government studies have attempted to address the issue of
mining code flexibility (or adaptability) for ocean hard minerals. 3 9 As
312. See note 143-147 and accompanying text. The performance requirements found in these
two mining codes could induce exploration activity, but we expect that these requirements will have
only a minor influence on the rate at which exploration is conducted.
313. See note 144 and accompanying text.
314. Hirshleifer & Riley, 26 J. Econ Lit. 1405 (cited in note 293).
315. Rooney, 8 Nat. Res. J. 654 (cited in note 161). Rooney refers briefly to "exploration
expenditure bidding" as an analog but does not elaborate on this variant.
316. Minerals Management Service, 52 Fed. Reg. at 9760 (1987) (cited in note 25); Stone and
MacGillvray, 4 Circum-Pacific Energy and Min. Conf. (cited in note 9).
317, See notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
318. Rooney, 8 Nat. Res. J. 659 (cited in note 161).
319. Stratton Commission, Marine Resources and Legal-Political Arrangements for their Development, Panel Reports, Vol. 3 at VII-l 17 (cited in note 72); NAS Panel, Mining in the Outer
Continental Shelf and in the Deep Ocean at 64 (cited in note 72); Geological Survey, Program
Feasibility Document: OCS Hard Mineral Leasing at 66 (cited in note 10); Geological Survey, USGS
Symposium at 272 (cited in note 2).
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"untried" resources, some ocean hard minerals initially may yield small
or nonexistent rents. Over time, as onshore resources deplete,32 ocean
resources may become important sources of some commodities that deliver economic rents either for the treasury or for the inducement of private
efforts that serve specific policy goals. It can be useful for the resource
manager to have the ability to make marginal changes in an ocean mining
code to control uncertainty and achieve resource conservation or other
policy goals. This kind of flexibility can be implemented at many different
levels.
Levels of Management Flexibility
Revenue generators and performance requirements might be negotiated
for each entitlement. The proposed NSHMA suggests that royalties would
be set or negotiated for each commercial recovery permit. 2 ' The application of such a system on a case-by-case basis could incur substantial
administrative costs. For ocean hard minerals, for which at least initially
there may be a small number of permits, such a system might be administratively feasible.
In 1983, participants at a symposium organized by the U.S. Geological
Survey suggested that "instead of a rigid regulatory structure, such as
that imposed on companies seeking to mine manganese nodules, a more
flexible approach be followed in which lease terms and conditions be
tailored uniquely for each offering." 322 Flexibility of this type, on a lease
sale-by-lease sale basis, also might incur administrative costs, but would
be less costly than flexibility on an individual permit basis. Individual
lease sale flexibility could permit experimentation with combinations of
core provisions in order to determine the most appropriate combination.
Multiple mining codes might be employed spatially or temporally. The
Stratton Commission Report, in 1969, suggested use of a mining code
modeled after the 1920 Minerals Leasing Act. 23 This Act established a
dual system in which solid minerals are leased competitively in "known
geological structures" but are leased on a first-come, first-serve preference
right basis in areas where geological structures are unknown,324 The Com320. Broadus, 235 Sci. 235 (cited in note 10).
321. NSHMA § 308(a)(2) (1988) (cited in note 19). The bill would require that terms, conditions,
and restrictions (which include royalties) be "uniform for all licenses and permits, except to the
extent that factual circumstances, including differing physical and environmental conditions, require
the establishment of special terms, conditions, and restrictions." NSHMA § 308(b) (1988).
322. Geological Survey, USGS Symposium at 272 (cited in note 2).
323. Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 226 (1982) (oil and gas lands); 30 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (1982)
(phosphate deposits); 30 U.S.C. § 272, 273 (1982) (sulphur).
324. National Research Council, Board on Mineral and Energy Resources, Known Geological
Structures Under the Mineral Leasing Act: Interpreting and Applying the Term "Known Geological
Structure of a Producing Oil and Gas Field" (1986). Tank, Legal Aspects of Geology at 457 (cited
in note 23).
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mission recommended that flexibility be incorporated into a system for
ocean hard minerals such that "the specific terms under which these OCS
lands are yielded to private development could be adjusted to reflect
differences from case to case and over time in our knowledge of and
capability to exploit mineral potentials." 32
One mining code might be employed with marginal adjustments over
time, as in OCSLA. For OCS oil and gas leases, the federal government
determines a uniform minimum bid for the bonus and applies a uniform
royalty to all entitlements. 26 By averaging over all entitlements in this
manner, administrative costs are reduced, but marginally productive deposits may be overlooked, and the government may fail to capture the
full rent from rich deposits. Minimum bids, rentals, and royalties might
be modified from time to time to respond to changing market conditions.32 7
Flexibility, Discretion, and Legal Uncertainty
A fundamental question concerns the degree to which management
flexibility raises the level of legal uncertainty and thereby deters private
investment in public mineral development. The relative profitability and
even commercial feasibility of specific entitlements are affected by the
resource manager's discretionary power to modify terms and conditions
subsequent to issuance of entitlements.32 Ocean mineral interests have
expressed dissatisfaction with the number of discretionary steps accorded
the Secretary of Interior under OCSLA.329 As most recently exposed in
Secretary of the Interior v. California,33 this discretionary power represents a potential loss of entitlements, even after lease issuance and
substantial investments have been made.
Notwithstanding legal uncertainty at the entitlement level, it is beneficial for resource managers to have the authority to adjust the core
provisions of a mining code. This authority allows a mining code to adapt
to society's changing values and goals over time. In 1978, amendments
to OCSLA provided for different types of bidding systems to be tested
on a trial basis. 33 ' The limited experience with these systems has shown
325. Stratton Commission, Marine Resources and Legal-Political Arrangements for their Development, Panel Reports, Volume 3 at VII-1 17 (cited in note 72).
326. OTA, Oil and Gas Technologies at 156 (cited in note 172).
327. Minerals Management Service, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,810 (1985) (cited in note 210).
328. All three mining ocean mining codes compared here do contain certain degrees of management discretion concerning the suspension, termination, or transfer of mineral entitlements. See,
e.g. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334(c),(d), 1337(e), 1351(j) (1982); DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1416,
1425(b) (1982); NSHMA §§310, 311, 312(b) (1988).
329. Greenwald, Prepared Statement (cited in note 139). See note 115 above.
330. 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
331. Jones, Mead & Sorenson, 19 Nat. Res. J. at 888 (cited in note 132).
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positive results.332 More recently, MMS has considered modifying minimum bid and performance requirements for OCS oil and gas minerals
in light of reduced demand for these ocean entitlements.333 MMS has
considered granting easements to Arctic sand and gravel deposits334 and
has under consideration a concept of offsets for post-entitlement exploration costs for ocean hard minerals.335 In the event that MMS succeeds
in implementing the offset approach, it will be beneficial for the agency
to have the option of returning to the pure bonus approach as knowledge
and geologic certainty increase.
It is important to distinguish management flexibility from the discretionary authority of the resource manager over specific entitlements. 336 It
is suggested here that a mining code can be made flexible without a
concomitant increase in both managerial discretion and legal uncertainty.
Flexibility involves the adjustment of core provisions to improve the
probability of achieving policy goals through future public mineral disposals. It is unclear whether any of the existing or proposed ocean mining
codes are truly flexible under this definition. The limits of OCSLA's
flexibility presently are being tested by consideration of regulatory proposals to modify revenue generation, performance, and information management provisions.337
Discretionary modification of existing entitlements, as distinguished
from mining code flexibility, will increase legal uncertainty by substituting
public "conservation" decisions for those of private developers. When
compared to the location-patent system of the 1872 Mining Law, all three
ocean mining codes appear to authorize a high degree of managerial
discretion. The three mining codes examined here contain iterations at
which resource managers can wield discretionary power to modify entitlements. As displayed in Figure 2, these discretionary iterations coincide
at a minimum with the "activities" for which leases, licenses, or permits
are required. Additional discretion may be exerted through stipulations
on OCS leases or through the terms, conditions, and restrictions that
attach to deep seabed licenses and permits. Except for production and
market control provisions applicable in some cases to hydrocarbon min332. GAO, Congress Should Extend Mandate to Experiment with Alternative Bidding Systems
in Leasing Offshore Lands at 7 (cited in note 165).
333. Minerals Management Service, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,810 (1986) (cited in note 210).
334. Minerals Management Service, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,541 (1983) (cited in note 84).
335. Stone & MacGillvray, 4 Circum-Paciflc Energy and Min, Conf. (cited in note 9).
336. Frequent or major changes to core provisions in the name of flexibility still could raise the
level of legal uncertainty. Thus the offshore oil and gas industry generally is reluctant for OCSLA
to be amended to modify § 8(k), because some risk exists that the oil and gas provisions also might
be modified.
337. Minerals Management Service, 51 Fed. Reg. at 39.810 (1986) (cited in note 210); Minerals
Management Service, 53 Fed. Reg. 4390 (1988) (cited in note 268).
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erals under OCSLA, a ' it is difficult to conclude that any one mining code
authorizes a higher degree of discretion. In the design of a mining code
for ocean hard minerals, so that the costs of legal uncertainty are minimized while variations in geologic uncertainty are controlled, significant
attention might be given to the potential benefits of flexibility and the
minimization of discretionary incursions into those entitlements already
established.
CONCLUSIONS
From this comparison of mining codes, it is apparent that much diversity exists in the methods that might be employed for providing access,
generating revenues, requiring performance, and managing information.
How can the most appropriate methods be identified for the disposal of
ocean hard minerals? The answer to this question cannot be determined
solely on the basis of past experience. To a large degree, the answer will
have to be determined in actual practice, through trial and error. Although
the political risks of "experimentation" with disposal methods are potentially great for the managing agency, there is one general principle
that can guide the identification process. This principle is economic conservation.
For any prospective mineral deposit, deciding the appropriate moment
and rate at which to initiate and conduct exploration, development, or
production can be difficult. Yet this timing decision is critical for conservation, in an economic sense, to be achieved. Modern public mineral
disposal, as evidenced by the mining codes examined here, is a kind of
resource conservation in which public resource managers play an important role in determining the timing of mineral development.
Resource managers concerned with the conservation of ocean hard
minerals should consider first methods of access that select developers
with the lowest costs of exploration, development, and production. Among
the ocean mining codes, OCSLA has the most potential to achieve this
selection through its competitive method of access. The collection of
economic rent is consistent with a goal of economic conservation. But
because rents may be small or nonexistent for many ocean hard minerals,
resource managers should not be overly concerned with the size of bonuses
or royalties.
Instead, attention should be directed toward minimizing administrative
costs. Under OCSLA, substantial administrative costs are spent to ensure
that, for oil and gas minerals, private developers do not themselves earn
excessive rents. In the early stages of ocean hard mineral disposal, because
338. OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1334(g), 1337(b)(7), 1354 (1982).
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rents will be small, efforts spent by resource managers to determine fair
market value or profits should be minimized. Other examples of administrative costs include holding lease sales, processing license or permit
applications, monitoring performance, and monitoring environmental effects (an area of significant administrative costs not examined here). From
an administrative standpoint, the performance requirements found in
DSHMRA, which allow private developers considerable leeway in implementing a development schedule, may be the least costly of those in
any of the mining codes examined here. Although DSHMRA and NSHMA
attempt to recover the costs of processing license and permit applications,
administrative costs are not reduced through this mechanism but instead
are transferred from the government to private developers. Resource managers may discover that the administrative costs of disposal far outweigh
the size of potential rents. If indeed this is true, then the disposal of ocean
hard minerals will be a misallocation of economic resources.
Care should be taken in implementing encouragements for exploration
activity. The nature of information as a public good can lead to underexploration. Yet there are broad incentives found in U.S. law that encourage mineral exploration and technology development. Moreover, for
several years the federal government has conducted a continuous level
of research on marine mineral resources, and the results of this research
are publicly available. The concept of shared exploration costs, such as
the OCSLA deep stratigraphic tests for hydrocarbons, deserves further
attention in the case of ocean-hard minerals.
The effect of uncertainty of any kind is to increase the costs faced by
private developers in proving-out and working a mineral deposit. But
because legal uncertainty can be reduced directly through the provisions
of a mining code, it is useful to distinguish legal uncertainty from geological uncertainty. Legal uncertainty can be reduced through increasing
security of tenure. A traditional distinction between leases and licenses,
that leases are more secure and thus legally more certain, has become
less important in modem public mineral disposal. But it would seem an
unnecessary development, one that would increase uncertainty, to create,
as NSHMA would, a "national seabed"
with a legal status inequivalent
339
to that of the outer Continental Shelf.
339. See text accompanying notes 154-158 above. Clearly, the supporters of the NSHMA proposal
must create a national seabed, otherwise they would be, in effect, amending OCSLA. See note 99
above. Although this point appears to revolve around a minor definitional issue, it is significant from
a hypothetical management perspective. Essentially, the national "seabed" would become yet another
large-scale ocean management enclosure. See generally Ross D. Eckert, The Enclosure of Ocean
Resources (1979). Because the current version of NSHMA authorizes NOAA as the resource manager,
one can imagine interagency jurisdictional disputes should NOAA plan to license or permit areas of
the seabed for ocean hard minerals that are in the same location as areas of the OCS that the
Department of the Interior plans to lease for oil and gas. This might raise the costs associated with
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Legal uncertainty also can be reduced through minimizing the managerial discretion to alter private exploration, development, and production
decisions. This perhaps will be the most difficult aspect in the design of
an ocean mining code. Resource managers will be unwilling to relinquish
discretionary authority over the disposal of public minerals, but it is more
likely that economic conservation will be achieved through private decisions about the timing of development. 3 At a minimum, once a specific
entitlement is made, revenue generators such as royalties should not be
changed. It is unclear that the proposed NSHMA would preclude the
modification of royalties on a specific entitlement over time. DSHMRA
may be looked to for minimizing managerial discretion in performance
requirements.
It is important to consider management flexibility as distinct from the
discretionary authority of the resource manager over specific entitlements.
Many ocean hard minerals are distinguished from their onshore counterparts because of relatively higher costs of discovery and exploration
(geologic uncertainty), development and production. These relative cost
conditions could change over time, as information is generated, technological advances occur, and onshore resources are depleted, among
other things. Because of this potential for change, it is beneficial for
resource managers to have the authority to adjust the core provisions of
a mining code for future disposals.
Under OCSLA, the government collects financial rents from the disposal of public minerals. The government might also trade away financial
rents, as under DSHMRA, in order to achieve certain policy goals like
encouraging private firms to recover designated strategic resources, to
develop ocean technology, or to help counterbalance the private costs of
uncertainty. While the collection of economic rent is consistent with a
goal of economic conservation, it does not necessarily follow that trading
rents away is also consistent. By trading rents in this manner, it becomes
difficult to determine whether economic resources are being allocated
efficiently. Furthermore, in the event that rents may be small or nonexistent; the potential for preferential encouragement of the ocean mining
activity is enhanced. In the case of prospective public resources, such as
the ocean hard minerals discussed here, attempts to achieve specified
policy goals may supplant a goal of economic conservation.
legal uncertainty for both prospective ocean hard mineral and oil and gas developers, irregardless
of the separation of disposal authorities. Whether it makes sense for MMS and NOAA to handle
this kind of problem on a case-by-case basis or whether the Interior Department should handle it
internally (if MMS was given ocean hard minerals management authority under some future version
of the bill) is an important question for Congress as it considers the bill. Given the current economic
significance of most ocean hard minerals, however, the extent to which this kind of problem might
occur in the near future seems small.
340. See notes 253-63 and accompanying text.
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Given a relatively low level of industrial interest and activity, it appears
extraordinary that presently so much attention is being paid toward the
development of mining codes for ocean hard minerals. It is possible that
recent advances in geologic understanding have triggered efforts to remodel existing law into a shape more favorable to commercial interests. 34'
Changes in marine jurisdictions, like the proclamation of a U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone, also might have kindled interest. 4 In any case, both
the Congress and the Department of the Interior now have opportunities
to examine methods for public ocean hard mineral disposal on the OCS
or on a national seabed. But the activity of ocean hard mineral mining
in the federal offshore should be viewed neither as necessarily justified
from a perspective of economic conservation nor as a foregone conclusion.
A uniform method for the disposal of public minerals, onshore and in
the ocean, would be a conservation-oriented, albeit probably unachievable, goal. Such an ideal could rely upon existing broad incentives to
generate information and develop technology and thus would not discriminate between ocean exploration activities and those on land. Private
mineral developers could consider the relative costs (including geologic
uncertainty) of public mineral development across jurisdictions and make
conservation decisions based upon these costs and not legal differences.
Such a goal is surely chimerical because, not counting the the territorial
seas and other public lands of individual states, at least six distinct mining
codes exist for public minerals in the United States. As public trustees
for the disposal of public ocean minerals, both Congress and federal
agencies must consider the potential for preferential diversion of economic
resources away from other productive endeavors through the implementation of yet another mining code.

341. The discovery of massive sulfide deposits at oceanic crustal spreading centers is a good
example. For a compendium of MPS discoveries, see Hoagland & Broadus, Seabed Material Commodity and Resource Summaries at 97 (cited in note 300).
342. EEZ Proclamation, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983) (cited in note 13).

